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The Risk of Statelessness: Reasserting a Rule
for the Protection of the Right to Nationality
David C. Baluartet
A global effort to combat statelessness and defend the universal right to
nationality is currently underway. Nevertheless, questions persist about
the proper scope of the right to nationality, the appropriate form of
statelessness protection, and the legal limits of state discretion to deny or
deprive an individual of nationality. These questions have animated a
heated transnational debate about statelessness in Hispaniola, where the
government of the Dominican Republic has designed a legal system that
excludes persons of Haitian descent from Dominican nationality. Central
to this conflict is a question about whether actions by the Dominican state
leave persons of Haitian descent stateless -without nationality anywhere
in the world. This question has been the subject of a decade-long dialogue
between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Dominican
justice system, which have expressed manifestly contrary views about the
existence of statelessness in Hispaniola. In its most recent decision on the
matter, the Inter-American Court declared that the Dominican state has
an obligation to grant nationality to children born in its territory who face
a "risk of statelessness." This Article is the first to explore this doctrinal
development, and it raises both legal and practical concerns regarding this
new rule of protection. This Article warns of potential parallels between
the "risk of statelessness" and "de facto" statelessness, which is a category
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unprotected under the international law of statelessness. It argues for the
continued use of legal statelessness as the definitive trigger for
statelessness protection and for the establishment of a standard of proof
that will permit a determination of statelessness for persons who have
disputed or unresolved nationality claims.
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INTRODUCTION
Events in recent years have revealed large numbers of people who have
no nationality anywhere in the world and who suffer myriad violations of
their human rights as a result of this acute vulnerability. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there
are at least ten million stateless persons globally,' and efforts to map
1. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], What Does It Mean To Be Stateless?,
http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/what-does-it-mean-to-be-stateless [https://perma.cc/PKF5-
8T7A]. To confront this challenge, in 2014, UNHCR launched a campaign to eradicate
statelessness within ten years. See UNHCR, A Campaign to End Statelessness: Launched on
the 60th Anniversary of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1 (Feb.
2014), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/53174df39.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC6W-6EMY].
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stateless populations have identified significant challenges related to
statelessness in every region of the world.2 A common characteristic of
these stateless populations is the marginalization they suffer, often
intentionally engineered by the state that they inhabit, and the vulnerability
that accompanies an existence without legal identity or protection.3
Stateless persons often do not have basic identity documents, and their
access to education, health services, and employment opportunities can be
elusive.4 Stateless persons are often targeted by security officials and
immigration authorities, and are more likely to be subjected to arbitrary
detention and expulsion.5 Moreover, discrimination and the threat of
physical violence seem to characterize the daily experience of many
stateless persons.6
At the core of the challenge of addressing statelessness is the tradition
of state control over the means of nationality acquisition and divestment.
States have long considered their authority over the rules of membership in
the nation to be among their most inherent powers.7 However, when the
United Nations proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that the right to a nationality was among the core human rights that
member states committed to respect and defend,8 the sovereign grip on
nationality began to loosen. This was because the human right to
nationality included both a guarantee of nationality to all and a prohibition
against the arbitrary deprivation of that right.9 Less than a decade later, a
regime for the international protection of stateless persons was created in
furtherance of the universal protection of the right to nationality.'o
2. See The World's Stateless, INST. ON STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION 53-132 (Dec. 2014),
http://www.institutesi.org/worldsstateless.pdf [https://perma.cc/67Y2-KS7Z] (covering
global, regional, and national statelessness statistics).
3. See David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 HUM. RTS.
Q. 245, 264-70 (2006); Jillian Blake, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Race-Based Statelessness in
the Americas, 6 GEO. J. L & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 139, 143-53 (2014); Katherine Southwick,
Preventing Mass Atrocities Against the Stateless Rohingya in Myanmar: A Call for Solutions, 68 J.
INT'L. AFF. 137, 139-42 (2015).
4. Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 3, at 266; Helne Caux, Stateless in West Africa,
UNHCR: TRACKS (Feb. 25, 2015), http://tracks.unhcr.org/2015/02/stateless-in-west-africa/
[https://perma.cc/J3WF-AJC7].
5. Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 3, at 267; see also Human Rights Watch, We Are
Dominican: Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality in the Dominican Republic (July 1, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/07/01/we-are-dominican/arbitrary-deprivation-
nationality-dominican-republic [https://perma.cc/CB2Q-BUW8] [hereinafter Human Rights
Watch Report on Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality in the Dominican Republic] (noting that
Dominican Republic practices "continue to arbitrarily deprive individuals of their right to
Dominican nationality and citizenship-related rights").
6. Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 3, at 270; see also Amnesty Int'l Austl., Who Are the
Rohingya Refugees? (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org.au/who-are-the-rohingya-
refugees [https://perma.cc/W7V5-QE83] (describing violence faced by the Rohingya).
7. See Peter J. Spiro, Citizenship, Nationality, and Statelessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MIGRATION 283-86 (Vincent Chetail & C6line Bauloz eds., 2014).
8. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15 (Dec. 10, 1948).
9. Id.




Baluarte: The Risk of Statelessness: Reasserting a Rule for the Protection
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
Nevertheless, many states have viewed the statelessness protection regime
with skepticism, and resisted international control over what they consider
to be a sovereign matter.
One major situation of statelessness is currently playing out on the
island of Hispaniola, where the right to Dominican nationality for the
children of Haitian migrants has been the topic of heated debate for
decades. On one side of the debate, human rights advocates have argued
that persons born to migrants in the Dominican Republic have acquired
Dominican nationality under the Constitution as a matter of birthright." On
the other, Dominican authorities have argued that an exception to the
Constitutional rule of birthright nationality excludes from Dominican
nationality the children of non-resident migrants, the vast majority of
whom are Haitian.1 2 For these children with a disputed claim to Dominican
nationality, much is at stake, including access to education, prospects for
employment, legal identity, and protection from the collective expulsions
that have swept the Dominican Republic for years."
A main point of contention in the Dominican nationality debate is
whether children of Haitian descent who are denied Dominican nationality
are left stateless. This is more than semantics; it is significant both
politically and legally if this population is classified as stateless. In political
terms, it matters whether Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent are
left stateless if they are denied Dominican nationality because stateless
persons are covered by the mandate of the UNHCR.1 4 The UNHCR's
engagement in any such situation brings to bear technical and financial
assistance that may not be available otherwise, as well as legitimacy in
political spheres. 5 In legal terms, it matters whether Dominican-born
11. See Human Rights Watch, Dominican Republic: Thousands at Risk of Deportation to
Haiti (June 30, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/30/dornirdcan-republic-
thousands-risk-expulsion-haiti [https://perma.cc/4W8C-GU3S].
12. See Monique A. Hannam, Soy Dominicano - The Status of Haitian Descendants Born in the
Dominican Republic, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1123, 1143 (2014); Case of the Girls Yean and
Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, 1 121 (Sept. 8, 2005).
13. Amnesty Int'l, "Without Papers, I Am No One": Stateless People in the Dominican Republic,
Al Index AMR 27/2755/2015, at 42-48 (Nov. 2015),
https:// www.amnestyusa.org/files/without-papers~stateless-people-dominican-republic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AYJ2-UNPV] [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l Report on Stateless People in the
Dominican Republic].
14. See G.A. Res. 3274 (XXIX) (Dec. 10, 1974); G.A. Res. 31/36 (Nov. 30, 1976); see also G.A.
Res. 50/152, TT 14-15 (1995) (encouraging UNHCR to continue to help stateless persons); G.A.
Res. 61/137, T 2-4 (2006) (recognizing UNHCR's work).
15. The UNHCR has set up operations in the Dominican Republic and been instrumental
in efforts to support civil society in its response to shifting Dominican nationality policy in
recent years. See UNHCR, The Caribbean: Factsheet (Mar. 2017),
http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20The%2Caribbean%2Factsheet%
20-%2OMarch%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3PG-NZQD] (noting that the UNHCR
maintains a country office in the Dominican Republic); see also UNCHR, UNHCR Urges
Dominican Republic to Refrain from Deportations of Stateless Individuals (June 19, 2015),
http://www.unhcr.org/558417759.html [https://perma.cc/W4DY-MTTY] (summarizing a
press briefing by a UNHCR spokesperson outlining the UNHCR's positions on the status of
stateless residents of Haitian descent).
50 [Vol. 19
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persons of Haitian descent are stateless because the law of statelessness
requires a grant of nationality in the place of birth if a child would
otherwise be stateless, and largely prohibits deprivation of nationality that
leaves a person stateless.16
Perhaps because of the political and legal importance of the
statelessness classification, each side of the nationality debate in the
Dominican Republic takes a position that flatly contradicts the other.' 7
Specifically, the nationality rights movement argues that statelessness is
widespread in Hispaniola, while Dominican authorities deny its existence.1 8
The two sides of this debate were articulated in the 2005 exchange between
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) and the
Dominican Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). That year, the Inter-American
Court decided The Girls Yean and Bosico v. Domincan Republic, in which it
found that the child of a Dominican mother and a Haitian father who had
been denied a Dominican birth certificate had been left stateless.19 The SCJ
reviewed the statelessness question just a few months later and found there
to be no problem because the children of Haitians born in the Dominican
Republic derived Haitian nationality from their parents under the Haitian
Constitution.20 The contrary positions of these two tribunals have
characterized the debate for nearly a decade.21
This debate evolved after the Constitutional Court of the Dominican
Republic issued a decision that nullified Dominican nationality for more
than 130,000 persons of Haitian descent in 2013.22 The Constitutional Court
reiterated the reasoning of the SCJ from years earlier, finding that its
16. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, arts. 1, 8, opened for signature Aug. 30,
1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1961 Convention].
17. See generally Stacie Kosinski, State of Uncertainty: Citizenship, Statelessness, and
Discrimination in the Dominican Republic, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMi' L. REv. 377, 378-82 (2009)
(outlining the conflicting principles upon which nationality can be based).
18. See Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, ¶¶
240, 247 (Aug. 28, 2014) (outlining both parties' arguments).
19. Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, ¶ 166 (Sept. 8,
2005).
20. Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJ] [Supreme Court of Justice], 14 diciembre 2005, BOLEFiN
JUDICIAL [B.J.] No. 1141, pp. 8-9 (Dom. Rep.),
http://ojd.org.do/Jurisprudencia/Constitucional/B.J.-num.-1141-diciembre- 2 0 0 5 .pdf
[https:/ /perma.cc/UF7J-A97K].
21. For a general discussion of nationality in the Dominican Republic and the relationship
between the Dominican Republic and the Inter-American Court, see Marselha Gonqalves
Margerin, Monika Kalra Varma & Salvador Sarmiento, Building a Dangerous Precedent in the
Americas: Revoking Fundamental Rights of Dominicans, 21 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9 (2014).
22. Tribunal Constitucional de la Repilblica Dominicana [TCRD] [Constitutional Court of
the Dominican Republic], 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13 [Judgment TC/0168/13],
http://tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentosSentencia%20TC%20
0 16
8-13%20-%20C.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YGQ-NUFDI. The UNHCR estimates that there are
133,770 stateless people in the Dominican Republic. While the initial estimate of stateless
persons was in the order of 210,000, UNHCR subsequently announced a downward revision
of that estimate based on more precise data analysis. See UNHCR, UNHCR Mid-Year Trends
2015, at 14 (2015), http://unhr.org/en-us/56701b969.pdf [https://perma.cc/M52G-7Z24].
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decision did not pose statelessness problems because denationalized
children of Haitian descent derived Haitian nationality from their parents.n
The Inter-American Court responded to the decision of the Constitutional
Court the next year in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican
Republic, finding human rights violations stemming from the denial of
Dominican nationality documents to persons of Haitian descent born in
Dominican territory. 24
With regard to the ongoing debate on statelessness, the Inter-American
Court took a novel analytical approach and extended protection under the
international law of statelessness to individuals who face a "risk of
statelessness."u Specifically, the Inter-American Court placed the burden
on the Dominican state to demonstrate that persons who had been born in
the Dominican Republic had access to Haitian nationality.26 In finding that
the Dominican Republic had not met this burden, and that certain
individuals of Haitian descent faced a "risk of statelessness," the Court
found a violation of the right to nationality and ordered the Dominican
Republic to issue Dominican nationality documents.27 In so doing, the
Court extended a well-established rule of protection that requires a state to
grant its nationality to stateless children born in its territory, such that the
rule now encompasses children who are born at "risk of statelessness."
This Article argues that in its notable effort to protect Dominican-born
persons of Haitian descent from the systematic human rights violations that
they face, the Inter-American Court stretched the international law of
statelessness beyond its understood limits. Indeed, there is little
disagreement at this point that the law of statelessness was designed to
protect de jure stateless persons, who have no nationality under the
operation of laws of any country. 28 To extend that body of law to protect
persons at "risk of statelessness" is to extend it, in effect, to de facto
stateless persons who were excluded -rightly or wrongly-from the
statelessness treaty regime. Stretching the law of statelessness beyond its
understood limits risks creating normative confusion, as well as
undermining both the authority of the Inter-American Court and the
growing movement to eradicate statelessness. This Article provides a path
to realign this jurisprudence with well-established international law norms
by returning to the rule that requires a finding of statelessness in order to
extend statelessness protection. It makes the further contribution of
providing a reasoned framework for the consideration of the "risk of
statelessness" as part of that statelessness determination.
23. See TCRD, 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13, pp. 77-79.
24. Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, ¶ 301
(Aug. 28, 2014).
25. Id. ¶ 298.
26. Id. T 297.
27. Id. ¶ 298.
28. See generally Hugh Massey (Sr. Legal Adviser, UNHCR Geneva), UNHCR and De Facto
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The first section of this Article will provide necessary legal background
on the right to nationality and statelessness. It will trace the development of
nationality from an expression of pure sovereign authority to a
fundamental human right under international law. It will then describe
how the right to nationality was further cemented by the development of
the international regime to protect stateless persons and reduce
statelessness, as well as how this legal protection framework has gained
influence in recent years. This section will highlight both the deep roots of
nationality regulation in sovereign state authority and the measured
inroads that have been accomplished in recent years to balance sovereign
authority against the need to protect stateless persons.
The second section will illustrate how the transnational legal debate
about the right to nationality and statelessness in the Dominican Republic
has led the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to create a new rule of
protection for persons who face a "risk of statelessness." It will begin by
describing the history and evolution of the Dominican nationality debate. It
will then describe how the nationality debate in the Dominican Republic
led to a series of legal rulings by the Inter-American Court, the Dominican
Supreme Court of Justice, and the Dominican Constitutional Court that
have interpreted and applied the international law of statelessness in the
Dominican context. Finally, this section will present a detailed account of
the Inter-American Court's statelessness analysis in Expelled Dominicans and
Haitians and will explain how its decision created a rule that requires a
grant of nationality in the country of birth for a child at risk of statelessness.
The last section of this Article will argue that the statelessness
determination should remain the threshold for protection under the
international law of statelessness, and will explain how a risk assessment
may appropriately be part of that determination. This section will first
analogize the "risk of statelessness" doctrine to the concept of de facto
statelessness, which is unprotected under the international law of
statelessness. It will then argue for a return to the statelessness
determination as the trigger for statelessness protection, and break down
the different considerations that must be part of a statelessness
determination process specifically tailored to the Dominican context.
Finally, the Article will argue that once the appropriate rule of protection is
reestablished, a standard of risk that will trigger a finding of statelessness is
necessary. It will conclude that a child who is more likely than not stateless
at birth should be considered a stateless person for purposes of
international protection and receive a mandatory grant of nationality in the
place of birth.
I. THE HUMAN RIGHT To NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS PROTECTION
The international community took many important steps in its work to
restore global order after the Second World War. The United Nations
planted the seed that would grow into the human rights legal order with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and consolidated regimes for
532017]
7
Baluarte: The Risk of Statelessness: Reasserting a Rule for the Protection
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
international protection for refugees and stateless persons. In this regard,
new normative frameworks arose simultaneously that required states to
respect the enumerated rights of individuals subject to their jurisdiction
and to provide protection to persons whose rights were violated by other
states. This new order encroached upon many areas in which states had
previously considered their authority to be sovereign and beyond reproach.
In particular, the decision to include the right to nationality in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), at the same time that the
global community elaborated an international framework for the protection
of stateless persons, marked a shift away from sovereign control of
nationality. Indeed, such limitations imposed by human rights law are
often viewed as antithetical to state sovereignty to the extent that they
compromise on the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.29 This
tension is particularly notable in the domain of nationality,3o where
regulation has long been considered inherent to sovereignty. 31 The
following section examines the evolution of nationality as a fundamental
human right, and the simultaneous development of the international legal
order for the protection of stateless persons, which exists as the principal
effort to consolidate global protection for the human right to nationality.
This section is intended to communicate the persistent tension in the
international regulation of nationality, and thereby acknowledge the
perspective of states that view such regulation as an unwarranted incursion
into internal affairs.
A. The Evolution of Nationality as an Individual Right
The twentieth century witnessed the rapid increase in the number of
nation states, from fifty-five states in 1914 to 192 states by 2002.32 This
increase was in large part the result of decolonization, when new states
around the globe established their independence from European
occupiers." In this context, the ability of nation states to define their
national membership was an important aspect of their efforts to consolidate
their sovereign authority. This resonated with the general notion under
international law that nationality was a matter of internal law not subject to
limitations by other sovereigns."
29. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31,
34 (1996) (opining that "[t]he international law of human rights penetrated the state monolith
beyond repair"); see also William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity: Challenging the Sovereignty
Norm through Human Rights Litigation, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 261, 264-69 (2002)
(tracking normative developments, such as human rights law, that have pushed back and
conflicted with sovereignty norms).
30. See HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 278 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
1966) (1951) (explaining that "[s]overeignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of
'emigration, naturalization, nationality, and expulsion.").
31. See Spiro, supra note 7, at 283-86.
32. ROBERT ROTBERG, WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (2003).
33. Id.
34. See Spiro, supra note 7, at 281.
54 [Vol. 19
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While states were not limited in how they regulated nationality, two
regimes for nationality acquisition became prevalent.35 States often had
rules by which their nationals could pass nationality to their children,
known as jus sanguinis nationality acquisition.36 Some states also provided a
right to nationality for persons born in the national territory, or jus soli
nationality acquisition.37 States codified laws about nationality that
incorporated elements of these two regimes, as well as rules about loss of
nationality, and viewed themselves as completely unencumbered by
international law in their efforts to create these legal orders.38
Nevertheless, in the early part of the twentieth century, it became
evident to the international community that international law regulation of
nationality acquisition would facilitate amicable interactions between
states. Once the international community had identified the goal of
providing guidance to nation states on nationality, it took a first step
towards this achievement with the promulgation of the 1930 Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930
Convention).39 While the general provisions of that early Convention were
clear that nationality was a matter to be regulated by internal law,40 the
Convention set forth rules about nationality with the goal of eliminating
conflicts arising from various state practices.41 Even with this concerted
effort to leave sovereign discretion over nationality unencumbered, this
attempt to provide loose international regulation of nationality was not
widely adopted and the Convention garnered only a few ratifications. 42
Nationality continued to be a source of conflict between states,
particularly in the sphere of diplomatic protection. There is no better
example than the Nottebohm Case, which involved an attempt by
Liechtenstein to vindicate the rights of a recently naturalized citizen against
Guatemala before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 43 Prior to the ICJ's
decision in the Nottebohm Case, it was uncontroversial that a state would
exercise diplomatic protection over one of its citizens in the face of a
violation by another state of that citizen's internationally protected rights."




39. Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, opened for
signature Apr. 13, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 4137.
40. Id. art. 1.
41. See Spiro, supra note 7, at 283.
42. Id.
43. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (1955). The case involved a
German citizen who moved to Guatemala in 1905 at the age of twenty-four to join his family
business, and remained there without acquiring Guatemalan citizenship. Id. at 13. Early in the
Second World War, Nottebohm traveled to Liechtenstein and acquired citizenship in that
country, which led to the automatic relinquishment of his German citizenship. Id. at 14. In
1941, Guatemala declared war on Germany, rendered Nottebohm to the United States, and in
1949 expropriated his property as enemy alien property without compensation. Id. at 18.
Nottebohm moved to Liechtenstein, which initiated proceedings before the ICJ to secure
compensation for its citizen's expropriated property.
44. See Audrey Macklin, Nottebohm Turns Sixty: Time to Retire? (unpublished manuscript)
552017]
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In its majority decision, the ICJ made citizenship a necessary but not
sufficient condition for diplomatic protection, and introduced a genuine
link requirement for recognition of nationality under international law.4 5
The ICJ held that: "nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact
of attachment a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties." 46 The ICJ then
used the rationale that Nottebohm was not "in fact more closely connected
with the population of [Liechtenstein] than with that of [Guatemala]" to
find his claim to Liechtenstein nationality ineffective, and Liechtenstein
without standing to sue Guatemala for violations of Nottebohm's rights
before the ICJ. 47
On its face, Nottebohm appears to undercut the force of the norm that
nations are free to establish rules of nationality acquisition. However, Peter
Spiro has expressed a belief that the ICJ decision is "sovereignty
reinforcing" for two important reasons.48 First, the decision is sovereignty
reinforcing because Liechtenstein was attempting to constrain Guatemala's
discretion over national matters.49 Upholding Liechtenstein's right to do so
would mean that a state's right to assert itself within the sovereign territory
of another was only as limited as its willingness to extend nationality.5 0
Further, Spiro believes that Nottebohm protects sovereignty in the sense that
it provides rules for the resolution of sovereign clashes vis-a-vis dual
nationals with regard to diplomatic protection.51 He emphasizes a reading
of Nottebohm that limits its significance to the arena of diplomatic
protection, and that the decision did not "negate his status as a national" in
Liechtenstein, nor did it purport to govern his status as a member of that
sovereign nation.52
Whatever forms the critiques and rationalizations of Nottebohm may
take, none dispute that the ICJ decision is a basic point of reference for the
discourse on the evolution of nationality in the twentieth century. The
decision should be read in the historical context of the post-war world and
in conjunction with the simultaneous evolution of human rights doctrine.
In 1948, the UDHR heralded a new era in the global consciousness with
regard to individual rights.53 UDHR Article 15 declared that "[e]veryone
has the right to a nationality," and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived
(on file with author).
45. Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 26.
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 23, 25-26.
48. Spiro, supra note 7, at 284.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 284-85.
52. Id. at 284.
53. See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Statement by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the
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of his nationality."5 The decision by states to recognize nationality as an
inalienable right represented a shift from the traditional conception of
nationality as a matter exclusively for state discretion. While the UDHR is
non-binding in character, it arguably changed the discourse around
nationality, and influenced the development of a number of influential and
widely ratified human rights treaties.
Often cited in this regard are the provisions of half a dozen major
human rights instruments consolidating norms of civil and political rights,
anti-discrimination protections, women's rights, and children's rights. First,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) codified
the UDHR protection for children, establishing in 1966 that "every child has
the right to acquire a nationality," 55 thereby recognizing the fundamental
importance of being a national in order to enjoy the protections of a state.
Notably, the Human Rights Committee has stated that "the rights set forth
in the Covenant apply to everyone . .. irrespective of his or her nationality
or statelessness." 56 A subsequent General Comment by the Human Rights
Committee provides that "States are required to adopt every appropriate
measure, both internally and in cooperation with other States, to ensure
that every child has a nationality when he is born." 57 These developments
are significant because the ICCPR is one of the most widely ratified human
rights treaties.5
Building on these children's rights guarantees set forth in the UDHR
and the ICCPR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
guarantees a child's right to acquire a nationality and includes an obligation
on states to utilize their laws in order to avoid statelessness among
children.59 Notably, like the ICCPR, the CRC enjoys near-universal
ratification." While the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families has far fewer
signatories, it is significant that it reiterates these protections for children
54. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 15.
55. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 24(3), opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 1916 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
56. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the
ICCPR, 27th sess., 1 1 (1986).
57. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 17: Article 24 (Rights of the Child), T 8
(1989). The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) also requires states parties to ensure equality between men and women in terms of
conveying nationality to one's children. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women art. 9(2), opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
58. There are 169 states parties to the ICCPR. See U.N. Treaty Collection [UNTC],
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Chapter IV: Human Rights, 4.




59. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
60. There are 196 states parties to the CRC. See UNTC, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with
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codified in the ICCPR and CRC in the specific case of migrant children.61
At the same time that the international community has consolidated the
right to acquire a nationality at birth though international conventions, it
has also further articulated the related protection against the arbitrary
deprivation of nationality.62 Specifically with regard to racial discrimination
in the right to a nationality, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) established that
"States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination
in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone ... to nationality." 63
A General Comment to the ICERD clarified that the scope of this protection
included the recognition "that deprivation of citizenship on the basis of
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin is a breach of States
Parties' obligations to ensure non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to
nationality."6"
These developments in major human rights treaties demonstrate the
shift from nationality as a matter exclusively in the purview of the state to
an individual human right. Moreover, many of these treaties have been
widely ratified, which indicates some measure of acceptance by the global
community. This development has been tracked in the body of
international law to protect stateless persons and reduce statelessness,
which has gained some momentum in recent years.
B. International Protection for Stateless Persons
The early efforts to create a body of international law to regulate
nationality at the 1930 Hague Conference incorporated an understanding
that every person should have a nationality, and that statelessness was to
be avoided.65 This sentiment was present in the preamble of the 1930
Convention, and it was reflected in the articles of the Convention itself,
which required that a person acquire another nationality before an
61. Int'l Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families art. 29, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93.
62. After only years after this protection was inscribed in the UDHR, the Convention on
the Nationality of Married Women reiterated the protection when it called on states to prohibit
the deprivation of the nationality of women through the formation or dissolution of marriage.
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women art. 1, opened for signature Feb. 20, 1957, 309
U.N.T.S. 65.
63. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art.
5(d)(iii), 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
64. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXX on
Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (Aug. 19,
2004). This protection is also explicitly extended to persons with disabilities in the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which clearly prohibits the deprivation of
nationality on the basis of disability. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
art. 18(1)(a), opened for signature Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
65. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law pmbl.,
opened for signature Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (stating "that it is in the general interest of the
international community to secure that all its members should recognise that every person
should have a nationality and should have one nationality only.").
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expatriation was completed and that an expatriated woman not lose her
nationality when married unless she acquired that of her husband.66 In fact,
concerns about statelessness were so significant that the 1930 Hague
Conference promulgated two additional protocols on the subject. The first
was the Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, which provided
that a child should acquire the nationality of the state of birth if her mother
was a national of the state of birth and her father was of unknown
nationality.67 The second was the Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness,
which would require a state to readmit an expatriated person who had
failed to acquire another nationality and had become indigent or engaged
in criminal activity in another state.68 Regardless, like the 1930 Convention
itself, these protocols had little practical effect due to their limited
ratification.69
When statelessness emerged again as a matter of international concern
after the Second World War, that concern had become more humanitarian
in nature. Indeed, early work by the U.N. General Assembly, Economic and
Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, and International Refugee
Organization forged the understanding of nationality as a fundamental
right at the same time that the protection of stateless persons was joined
with the global conversation about the need for refugee protection. 70 There
was an evident concern for the legal situation of "persons who do not enjoy
the protection of any government,"71 and while efforts focused more on
providing assistance to refugees, stateless persons were also viewed as
"unprotected" and in need of a comparable legal solution.72
In 1950, the U.N. General Assembly convened a Conference of
Plenipotentiaries for a draft convention on the status of refugees and a draft
66. Id. arts. 7-11.
67. Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness art. 1, opened for signature Apr. 12,
1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 115.
68. Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness art. 1, Apr. 12, 1930, 2252 L.N.T.S. 1435.
69. See Spiro, supra note 7, at 283.
70. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill (Senior Research Fellow), Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons: Introductory Note for the U.N. Audiovisual Libr. of Law, at 1 (2010),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cssp/cssp-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM7T-3J9K].
71. Id. (quoting Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Commission on Human Rights on the
Second Session, 1 46, U.N. Doc. E/600 (1947)).
72. Id. at 1-2. In his recounting of the 1950 summary records of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems, Goodwin-Gill explains that the representatives that
formed the Ad Hoc Committee disagreed about the relationship between protection for
refugees and stateless persons. For example, French and U.S. representatives pushed for an
immediate solution to the pressing refugee problem, but the former believed that statelessness
was a less urgent "continuing concern of the world community," id. at 2 (quoting U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council, Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, Summary Record of the
Second Meeting, ¶8, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.2 (Jan. 26, 1950)), and the latter suggested that
some non-refugee stateless persons may not even require protection of the UN, id. Other
representatives were concerned about similar gaps in protection suffered by each group and
the need for comparable legal solutions. Id. at 3. The resulting recommendation was to create a
convention for the protection of refugees and an additional protocol whereby states may agree
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protocol on stateless persons.73 The Conference adopted and opened for
signature the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention), but recommended that the question of a draft protocol be
referred back to the U.N. for further study.74 Ultimately, after
reconsideration of the statelessness problem, a U.N. Conference resolved to
adopt a separate Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in
1954 (1954 Convention).7 5
The 1954 Convention spoke of statelessness in terms of human rights,
utilizing the Preamble to contextualize the Convention not only as a
companion to the Refugee Convention but also as an upshot of human
rights protection envisioned in the UDHR. 76 Like the 1951 Convention, the
1954 Convention included a framework to assist states in defining the
juridical status of stateless persons, as well as establishing criteria for access
to employment and public services?' In essence, these two Conventions
provided the means to settle the vast "unprotected" population that had
been displaced by the Second World War and was seeking legal stability.
Perhaps the most notable contribution of the Convention was to
provide an international law definition of "stateless person" as one who is
"not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law."7 8
However, the 1954 Convention did envision the group of stateless persons
protected as somewhat limited. Specifically, only those who are not
nationals under the operation of the nationality laws of any country are
stateless persons protected under the Convention.79 As commentators have
observed, this leaves out any number of "unprotected" people who suffer
severe and sustained rights deprivation but cannot demonstrate the
negative proposition that no country's law operates to provide them with
nationality.80
Perhaps more significant than the limitations on the definition were the
limitations in application that arose from a low level of ratification. By 1961,
when the 1951 Convention had twenty-five parties, the 1954 Convention
had just seven.81 The practical effect of this was that many more countries
took on the international legal obligation to protect refugees than those that
73. Id. at 3 (citing G.A. Res. 429(V) (Dec. 19, 1950)).
74. Id.; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
75. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 70, at 4.
76. 1954 Convention, supra note 10, pmbl.
77. See id. arts. 12-24.
78. UNHCR, Introductory Note to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, at 3, http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/1954-Convention-
relating-to-the-Status-of-Stateless-Persons ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ3J-4PHP] (quoting
1954 Convention, supra note 10, art. 1(1)).
79. 1954 Convention, supra note 10, art. 1(1).
80. See, e.g., LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw 19-27 (2008).
81. See UNTC, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Chapter V:
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 3. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%201/Chapter%20V/V-3.en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ERR4-7AG4] [hereinafter Status of the 1954 Convention].
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committed to protect stateless persons. This may have been a reflection of
the perception of the international community that statelessness was not as
pressing a problem as refugee protection. It may also have been a reflection
of the disinclination of states to regulate matters concerning nationality
with international law, even in the context of international protection.
Regardless, by the time the international community returned to the
work of statelessness with the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (1961 Convention), few states had demonstrated their
willingness to combat statelessness by ratifying the 1954 Convention.
Nonetheless, the 1961 Convention picked up where the 1954 Convention
left off and provided an international framework for states to coordinate
domestic nationality laws to prevent persons from becoming stateless. The
object and purpose of the 1961 Convention is for states to develop their
nationality laws in a manner consistent with the "international norms
relating to the protection of the right to nationality, including the principle
that statelessness should be avoided." 82 The 1961 Convention aims to
protect against statelessness in a variety of circumstances, and provides
important rules for nationality acquisition, deprivation, and renunciation.83
Perhaps the greatest focus of the 1961 Convention is to guarantee
everyone's right to a nationality, and it gives particular emphasis to the rule
that that all persons must acquire a nationality at birth.8"
Together, the 1954 and 1961 Conventions set forth a framework of
international obligations to provide status to stateless persons and prevent
the problem from reproducing itself. However, like the 1930 Nationality
Convention that preceded them, both conventions were plagued by low
levels of ratification. By 1980, the 1954 Convention had garnered only
thirty-one ratifications, and the 1961 Convention only ten.85 As was the case
with the 1930 Convention, low levels of ratification were likely expressive
of the disinclination of states to cede their sovereign authority over matters
relating to nationality.
There was a shift in the 1990s, at least in terms of the global awareness
of the problem of statelessness, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
the Yugoslav Republic. In many of the successor states that began to form,
ethnic conflicts developed as ethnic majority groups used nationality as a
82. UNCHR, Introductory Note to the Text of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, at 3 (May 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/1 9 6 1-
Convention-on-the-reduction-of-StatelessnessENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM6K-FSB3].
83. 1961 Convention, supra note 16, arts. 4-7.
84. Id. art. 1. See also UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4: Ensuring Every Child's
Right to Acquire a Nationality through Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, U.N. Doc. HCR/GS/12/04 (Dec. 21, 2012) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines on
Statelessness No. 4] ("Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention principally concern acquisition of
nationality by children. The cornerstone of efforts to prevent statelessness among children is
the safeguard contained in Article 1 of the 1961 Convention.").
85. See Status of the 1954 Convention, supra note 81; UNTC, Chapter V: Refugees and
Stateless Persons, 4. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%201/Chapter%
2OV/V4.en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95HB-FVMV] [hereinafter Status of the 1961 Convention].
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weapon against more vulnerable minorities.86 Statelessness was often the
result, and this was a major factor that led to a reinvigorated global
conversation about the protection against statelessness.8 7 Notably, this
concern was compounded by statelessness issues that were emerging in the
context of forced migration flows and new multi-party democracies, where
citizenship laws were being used to quash opposition.88
Concerns about statelessness gained steam at the turn of the century, a
trend attributable in large part to the work of the UNHCR, the international
body charged with protecting stateless persons under the 1954 and 1961
Convention frameworks. 89  National and international advocacy
organizations have worked tirelessly to shed light on situations of
statelessness around the globe, and in 2014, the UNHCR launched a global
initiative to eradicate statelessness by 2024, known as the "#IBelong
Campaign."" Growing concern about this problem has led to a steady
increase in the rate of ratification of the statelessness conventions.
Specifically, twenty-three states have ratified the 1954 Convention since
2010, which represents 25% of the total number of states parties and has
brought the total number of ratifications to ninety.9
The increased awareness about statelessness that prompted the U.N.
campaign, and that continues to motivate work in this area has increased
the visibility of the problem of statelessness. Increased ratification of the
statelessness instruments is likely a byproduct of this increased visibility.
Nevertheless, challenges to state practices related to nationality acquisition
and deprivation tend to be flash points for international controversy, and
states often respond to allegations that their policies produce statelessness
by citing their sovereign authority over matters pertaining to nationality.
One of the most visible examples of this trend is the nationality crisis that
has unfolded in the Dominican Republic over the last decade.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE "RISK OF STATELESSNESS" DOCTRINE IN
HISPANIOLA
One of the most pressing situations of statelessness in the world today
is that which has unfolded in the Dominican Republic, where the UNHCR
has reported a population of more than 130,000 stateless persons.2 This
nationality rights crisis in that country has emerged against the backdrop of
historic marginalization and mistreatment of Haitian migrants and their
86. See VAN WAAs, supra note 80, at 18.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 18-19.
89. See G.A. Res. 50/152, supra note 14, ¶¶ 14-15 (entrusting the UNHCR with
responsibility for stateless persons); G.A. Res. 61/137, supra note 14, ¶f 1-4 (same).
90. See UNHCR, #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness,
http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong-campaign-to-end-statelessness.htnd [https://perma.cc/BX94-
85Q6].
91. See Status of the 1954 Convention, supra note 81.
92. See UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015, supra note 22, at 14.
62 [Vol. 19
16
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 19 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol19/iss1/2
The Risk ofStatelessness
children.9 This history has fed widespread prejudice, which has in turn
been stoked by xenophobic extremists, and created the conditions necessary
for the disenfranchisement of Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent.94
In this environment, Dominican authorities have elaborated policies,
promulgated laws, and even overseen a Constitutional reform that has
resulted in the systematic denial and deprivation of Dominican nationality
to Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent. 95
The following section explores how the Dominican Republic has
implemented measures of nationality discrimination over the last two
decades, and looks at the role of the human right to nationality and
statelessness protection in combating the consolidation of a system of
institutionalized racism. This section will first set out the legal framework
in which the nationality debate has unfolded in the Dominican Republic
and highlight the abuses that have led to the situation of statelessness.
Next, this section will track a debate between the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the high courts of the Dominican Republic about the
proper role for the law of statelessness in addressing the situation of
persons denied Dominican nationality.
Finally, this section will present the Inter-American Court's decision in
Expelled Dominicans and Haitians vs. Dominican Republic, in which the Court
took a novel normative step to protect those who face a "risk of
statelessness" in the Dominican Republic. Specifically, the Court expanded
the well-established rule described in the previous section that a state must
guarantee its nationality to a child born stateless in its territory. The Court
found that the Dominican Republic had an obligation to determine whether
children born in its territory were stateless, and in finding that it had failed
to do so, required it to guarantee Dominican nationality to persons who
faced a risk of statelessness. This discussion frames the critique presented in
the final section of this paper.
A. Nationality Rights and Statelessness in Hispaniola
The history of Dominican and Haitian relations is long and complex.96
An account of the common history of these two conjoined island nations
often begins with the 1822 invasion by Haitian forces of the Dominican
Republic directly after its independence from Spain in 1821.97 The period of
Haitian occupation lasted until 1844, and was followed by persistent
conflicts that left scars that have marked Dominican-Haitian relations for
93. See Edward Paulino, Dominican Republic: Bearing Witness to a Modern Genocide,
BERKELEY REV. LATIN AM. STUD., Spring-Fall 2016, at 51, 55.
94. See Bridget Wooding, Upholding Birthright Citizenship in the Dominican Republic, 44
IBEROAMERICANA - NORDIC J. LATIN AM. CARIBBEAN STUD. 99, 99-101 (2014).
95. See Amnesty Int'l Report on Stateless People in the Dominican Republic, supra note 13, at 11-
21.
96. See Blake, supra note 3, at 143-48; Hannam, supra note 12, at 1132-36.
97. D.J. Lecce, International Law Regarding Pro-Democratic Intervention: A Study of the
Dominican Republic and Haiti, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 247, 248 (1998).
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decades. 98 Notably, Dominican Independence Day celebrates independence
from Haiti.9
The history of the right to Dominican nationality at birth reflects the
history of the island itself. In 1844, when the Dominican Republic became
independent from Haiti, it promulgated a protectionist Constitution that
gave birthright citizenship only to children born to Dominicans. 100 In 1858,
the Dominican Republic changed course and incorporated a broad rule of
birthright nationality in a manner consistent with most other countries in
the Americas, guaranteeing Dominican nationality to all persons born in
the national territory. 101 In the decades that followed, there were slight
adjustments to this absolute rule of birthright nationality.102
In 1929, a new formulation was included in the Constitution that would
provide the rule of birthright nationality in the Dominican Republic for
more than 80 years.'os This provision pronounced that Dominican
nationality would be granted to anyone born in the nation's territory, with
the exception of those people born to foreigners in diplomatic service or "in
transit."104 Surprisingly, no clear definition of "in transit" was provided at
the time, and no legislation directly addressed this constitutional language
for 75 years.105
This is surprising in part because Haitian migration towards the
Dominican Republic flowed nearly unencumbered through a clearly
demarcated though porous border throughout the twentieth century.106
This migration took place to supply labor in the agricultural, construction,
and domestic service sectors, and led to notable contributions by Haitians
to socio-cultural life in the Dominican Republic. 0 7 Hundreds of thousands
of Haitian migrants made the Dominican Republic their home'08 and their
children were considered Dominican under the prevailing interpretation of
the Dominican Constitution.1 0 9
Discrimination and state-authored violence towards the Haitian
98. See SAIS Int'l Human Rights Clinic, Torn at the Seam: Migration, Deportations, and
Humanitarian Concerns on the Island of Hispaniola, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. SCH. OF ADV. INT'L
STUD. (SAIS), 14-20 (2016), https://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/tom-at-the-
seam sais-ilaw-hrc-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE85-5ZEX].
99. Id. at 14.
100. PRIMERA CONSTITUCION DOMINICANA [FIRST DOMINICAN CONSTITUTION], Nov. 6,
1844, art. 7 (Dom. Rep.).
101. TCRD, 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13, pp. 49-50.
102. Id. pp. 50-51.
103. Id. pp. 49-52.
104. REVISION DE 20 DE JUNIO DE 1929 DE LA CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
[JUNE 20,1929 REVISION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC], June 20, 1929, art.
8(2).
105. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
106. See Hannam, supra note 12, at 1133.
107. See id.
108. See Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, ¶ 157
(Aug. 28, 2014).
109. See id. ¶¶ 289-91, 295 (explaining changes in interpretation of the Constitution and the
view prevailing until at least 2004).
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migrant population was common throughout this period,110 and this ethnic
tension influenced immigration and nationality policies. Memos recently
opened to the public from the Dominican National Archive demonstrate
this relationship. For example, a memo from the State Secretary of the
Armed Forces to President Joaquin Balaguer and other members of his
cabinet in 1976 proposed a reform to Dominican laws to address the
problem of Haitian migration.'11 The specific proposal was to redefine the
status of Haitian workers who arrived in the Dominican Republic to labor
in the agricultural sector as foreigners "in transit," thereby creating a legal
barrier to their children becoming Dominican nationals.112 This memo
emphasized that such a change would require "substantial" alterations to
laws governing national identification documents and immigration.113 This
proposed legislative change was never made, but it helps to explain events
that unfolded over the years that followed.
Throughout the 1990s, societal discrimination began to manifest more
regularly in the civil registry, and Haitian migrants who sought to register
their children as Dominican began to encounter problems.114 Legal
challenges became more common, and one appeals court published a
decision in 2003 declaring that the "in transit" exception did not encompass
the children of irregular migrants.115 Nevertheless, stories of the children of
Haitian migrants being denied birth certificates in civil registries became
increasingly widespread, as did the stories of missed educational and other
opportunities that accompanied these denials.116
Then, in 2004, the Dominican legislature passed a new immigration law
in which it explicitly defined categories of "non-resident" migrants as "in
transit" under the Constitution.117 Among these categories of non-residents
110. Perhaps the most troubling manifestation of this sentiment was the massacre of an
estimated 15,000 Haitian migrants in 1937, an effort at ethnic cleansing initiated by the
dictator, President Rafael Trujillo. See Richard Lee Turits, A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed:
The 1937 Massacre in the Dominican Republic, 82 HisP. AM. HIST. REv. 589, 589-91 (2002).
111. Comunicaci6n 4411 del Secretario de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas, Mayor General
Juan Rene Beauchamp Javier al Presidente de la Repiiblica, Joaquin Balaguer [Communication
4411 from the Secretary of State of the Armed Forces, Major General Juan Rene Beauchamp
Javier, to the President of the Republic, Joaquin Balaguer] (Mar. 2, 1976) [hereinafter
Communication 4411] (Dom. Rep.); see also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, ¶ 113, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 45/15 (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/DominicanRepublic- 2 015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96MB-KJJ4] [hereinafter 2015 IACHR Report on the Dominican Republic]
(discussing the content of Communication 4411).
112. Communication 4411, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. See Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians ¶¶ 163-66.
115. See La Camara Civil de Corte de Apelaci6n del Distrito Nacional [The Civil Chamber
of the Appeals Court of the National District], 16 octubre 2003, Sentencia No. 453 [Judgment
No. 453] (Dom. Rep); see also Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 130, ¶ 154 (Sept. 8, 2005) (discussing Judgment No. 453).
116. See The Girls Yean and Bosico TT 144-47.
117. Ley General de Migraci6n, No. 285-04 [General Migration Law, No. 285-04], art. 36.
(G.O. No. 10291) (Aug. 15, 2004) (Dom. Rep.). Note that this appeared to be the same legal
proposal that had been made in the Balaguer-era memo, but that was never implemented.
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defined under the law were irregular migrants, borderland populations,
students, and temporary workers -categories that were generally
considered to overlap with the majority of the Haitian migrant population
in the Dominican Republic.118
The international human rights community became increasingly
engaged in the plight of Haitian migrants and their children throughout
this period.119 The most concrete intervention to address discriminatory
practices related to nationality came with The Girls Yean and Bosico v.
Dominican Republic, a case decided by the Inter-American Court in 2005.120
The case of Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico was emblematic of the plight
of the children of Haitian descent.1 21 These two girls had Dominican
mothers and Haitian fathers, and were born in or around bateyes-
communities of agricultural workers who labored on sugar plantations -
rather than in hospitals.12 2 When their mothers traveled to the civil registry
to request late issued birth certificates, they were told that they did not
qualify because they could not meet onerous documentary requirements. 23
Unable to secure a birth certificate, Violeta was forced to leave fourth grade
and had to study in night school with adults.124 Moreover, the children
suffered psychologically as a result of the marginalization and
discrimination they suffered.125 Theirs was the experience of many children
of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic at that time, who were
similarly denied birth certificates despite their apparent right to Dominican
nationality under the Constitution.126
The Inter-American Court set forth an international law framework
which limited the discretion of the Dominican Republic in matters of
nationality: "on the one hand, by their obligation to provide individuals
with the equal and effective protection of the law and, on the other hand,
by their obligation to prevent, avoid and reduce statelessness."1 27 The Court
found that Dominican authorities had arbitrarily applied overly strict
documentary requirements to the girls' requests for late registration, and
refused to register their births when they failed to meet those
requirements.1 28 The Court considered the actions of the civil registry in the
118. Id.
119. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Dominican
Republic, Chap. IX, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.104, doc. 49 rev. 1 (Oct. 7, 1999),
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/DominicanRep99/Chapter9.htm [https://perma.cc/M5J4-
GCLS].
120. The Girls Yean and Bosico at 85 (indicating the date of the judgment).
121. See Joshua Armstrong, Dark Skin and 'Strange' Name Lead to Landmark Ruling,
CRONKITE BORDERLANDS INITIATIVE,
http://cronkite.asu.edu/buffett/dr/landmark-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/SX28-GDUJ].
122. The Girls Yean and Bosico TT 109(6)-109(8).
123. Id. TT 109(14)-109(17).
124. Id. ¶¶ 109(34)-109(37).
125. Id. T 86(c)(1) (summarizing an Expert Report by D6bora E. Soler Munczek,
psychologist).
126. Id. ¶ 85(b)(1) (summarizing an Expert Report by Samuel Martinez, anthropologist).
127. Id. ¶ 140.
128. Id. ¶ 166.
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context of the history of anti-Haitian sentiment in the Dominican Republic,
and referred to reports of systematic discriminatory refusals to register the
births of children born to Haitian parents. 129 The Court then concluded that
the arbitrary denial of birth registration deprived the two girls of their
human right to nationality and left them stateless.130
In finding that the girls were stateless, the Court did not specifically
analyze or address Haitian law regarding nationality; rather, it focused on
the wrongful actions of the Dominican authorities in denying them
Dominican nationality.131 This determination by the Inter-American Court
that these girls who were born in the Dominican Republic to a Haitian
parent became stateless when they were denied Dominican nationality set
off a statelessness debate that still rages today.
B. A Clash Over the Meaning of Statelessness
The decision of the Inter-American Court in The Girls Yean and Bosico
came on the heels of the 2004 immigration law, which declared that the
children of non-residents would not be considered Dominican nationals
because their parents were "in transit" under the Constitution. 132 A broad
coalition of Dominican civil society actors challenged the law as
unconstitutional, arguing that this interpretation of "in transit" was both
contrary to the evident meaning of the Constitution and discriminatory in
purpose and effect.133
The Dominican Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), sitting in its capacity as
a constitutional court, held the 2004 immigration law to be constitutional
just months after the Inter-American Court decided The Girls Yean and
Bosico.134 The SCJ set forth a very different analysis of the state's
international obligations. First, it addressed the argument that the law was
discriminatory, finding that it was not because it treated all foreigners
equally.135 Then it addressed the argument that the law perpetuated
statelessness, but found that there was no basis for this concern because the
children of migrants would derive Haitian citizenship from their Haitian
parents.136 The SCJ specifically referenced the Constitution of Haiti, which
provided that all persons born to Haitians in foreign territory would be
considered nationals of Haiti.137
While the decision of the SCJ did not refer specifically to the Inter-
129. Id. TT 168-70.
130. Id. ¶¶ 166, 172, 174.
131. Id. IT 152-172.
132. General Migration Law, No. 285-04, supra note 117, art. 36 (Dom. Rep.).
133. Demanda en Declatoria de Inconstitucionalidad de la Ley General de Migraci6n 285-
04 [Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment on the Unconstitutionality of the General Law of
Migration No. 285-04] (Jun. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
134. The SCJ made its ruling on December 14, 2005. See SCJ, 14 diciembre 2005, B.J. No.
1141, p. 1 (Dom. Rep.).
135. Id. at 7-8.
136. See id. at 8-9.
137. See id. at 9.
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American Court decision, there was little question that it was responding to
the regional tribunal in both the form and substance of its analysis. First, it
issued its decision only months after the Inter-American ruling, and after
very public pronouncements of high-level Dominican officials denouncing
the regional tribunal.1m Second, the SCJ followed the framework that the
Inter-American Court had set forth in The Girls Yean and Bosico, analyzing
possible limitations on the interpretation of the nationality provision of the
Dominican Constitution set by state obligations not to discriminate and to
reduce statelessness. 139 The SCJ purported to apply the American
Convention on Human Rights and other key human rights instruments, 140
and provided a specific analysis of the obligations of the Dominican
Republic under the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 141
This exchange between the Inter-American Court and the SCJ elevated
the issue of statelessness in the debate about nationality in the Dominican
Republic. The political and legal significance of statelessness was made
evident by the reasoning of each court, and each side of the nationality
debate began to view the statelessness question as important to its ability to
prevail. Both national and international actors took this cue and began to
refine their positions as to the statelessness of persons born in the
Dominican Republic to Haitian parents.
Meanwhile, the situation deteriorated in the Dominican Republic. Once
the 2004 law had been sustained as constitutional, the Central Electoral
Board (junta Central Electoral, "JCE"), which was the entity responsible for
birth registration and national identification documents in the Dominican
Republic, began to apply its nationality framework retroactively. 142 In 2007,
an internal memo of the JCE known as "Circular 017" directed civil registry
offices to review birth certificates before issuing copies of identity
documents. 143 The JCE then issued "Resolution 12," which provided that
138. See David C. Baluarte, Inter-American Justice Comes to the Dominican Republic: An Island
Shakes as Human Rights and Sovereignty Clash, 13 HuM. Rts. BRIEF 25, 28 (2006) (discussing
multiple officials' reactions to the Inter-American Court's decision in The Girls Yean and Bosico).
139. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
140. See SCJ, 14 diciembre 2005, B.J. No. 1141, p. 3 (Dom. Rep.) (listing human rights
instruments the SCJ took into account); id. at 5 (listing relevant portions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights).
141. Id. at 8-9. The Dominican Republic signed the 1961 Convention in 1961. See Status of
the 1961 Convention, supra note 85.
142. See SAIS Int'l Human Rights Clinic, Justice Derailed: The Uncertain Fate of Haitian
Migrants and Dominicans of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.
SCH. OF ADVANCED INT'L STUD. 22 (2015), https://www.sais-
jhu.edu/sites/default/files/Final-Report-Justice-Derailed-The-Uncertain-Fate-2015-vl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZZ6H-HQPT].
143. Junta Central Electoral [JCE] [Central Elections Board], Circular No. 017 del 29 de
marzo de 2007, que consigna el estricto cumplimiento a la Ley No. 659 sobre Actos del Estado
Civil y sus modificaciones al firmar las Actas de Nacimiento o cualquier documento [Circular
No. 017 of Mar. 29, 2007, pronouncing strict compliance with Act No. 659 governing Civil
Status Acts and its amendments when signing Birth Certificates or any document] (Mar. 29,
2007) (Dom. Rep.); see also 2015 IACHR Report on the Dominican Republic, supra note 111, ¶ 166
(discussing the issuance and effects of Circular No. 017); Open Soc'y Justice Initiative,
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civil registry offices should suspend birth certificates with irregularities,
and that the JCE would initiate proceedings for the nullification of these
documents in appropriate cases.144
Many people whose nationality documents were deemed to contain
irregularities pursuant to Circular 017 had been registered by Haitian
parents with a work permit. Persons registered in this manner had
understood themselves to be Dominican, and many had been documented
as such their entire lives. These people were at once told that they had been
issued documentation under an erroneous interpretation of the
Constitution, and that they were not Dominican. This campaign of
denationalization began perhaps the most troubling chapter in recent
history of the treatment by the Dominican State of this national ethnic
minority.
In 2010, the Dominican Republic took steps to definitively end the
nationality debate by amending the nationality provision of its Constitution
to guarantee nationality to all persons born in the Dominican national
territory, excluding the children of "foreigners in transit or residing illegally
in the Dominican territory."145 Article 18 of the 2010 Constitution further
provides that "[a]ny foreigner defined as such in the Dominican laws is
considered a person in transit." 146 The effect of this provision was to
provide clarity about who would have birthright nationality in the
Dominican Republic, and to ensure the constitutionality of the framework
set forth in the 2004 law. Nevertheless, this change did not resolve the
situation of persons who had been born under the previous constitutional
framework and believed themselves to be Dominican.
Persons affected by the policy of denationalization began to raise legal
challenges against the decisions of the JCE to seize nationality
documents.147 There was a split in resolution of these cases, with some
lower court judges finding that denationalization constituted a violation of
the Constitution, which clearly extended birthright nationality to the
children of long-term, irregular migrants.148 Other judges agreed with the
Dominicans of Haitian Descent and the Compromised Right of Nationality, OPEN SOC'Y
FOuNDS. 11-13 (Oct. 2010),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Dominican-Republic-
Nationality-Report-ENG-20110805.pdf [https://perma.cc/D66U-FHSP] [hereinafter Open
Society Report on the Compromised Right of Nationality] (same).
144. JCE, Resoluci6n No. 12/2007 de fecha 10/12/07, sobre procedimiento de suspensi6n
provisional de la expedici6n de Actas del Estado Civil viciadas o instrumentadas de manera
irregular. [Resolution No. 12/2007 of Dec. 10, 2007, which establishes the procedure for
provisionally suspending issuance of birth, marriage and death certificates that are defective
or were issued improperly] (Dec. 10, 2007) (Dom. Rep.); see also 2015 IACHR Report on the
Dominican Republic, supra note 111, ¶¶ 166-67 (discussing the issuance and effects of Resolution
No. 12/2007); Open Society Report on the Compromised Right of Nationality, supra note supra note
143, at 13 (same).
145. 2010 CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA [2010 CONSTITUTION OF THE
DOMINICAN REPuBLIC], Jan. 26, 2010, art. 18.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., TCRD, 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13.
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JCE interpretation that had been framed in the 2004 immigration law,
specifically finding that "non-residents," as redefined in that law, were "in
transit" under the Constitution and therefore their children were not
Dominican citizens.149 These cases were appealed, and they ultimately
arrived at a new Constitutional Court, which had been established by the
2010 Constitution. 150
In 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court elaborated on positions
taken by the SCJ with regard to the scope of "in transit" exception to
birthright nationality'51 and retroactively interpreted the nationality
provisions of every Dominican Constitution since 1929.152 The case was that
of Julianna Deguis Pierre, a woman whose birth certificate had been
confiscated by the JCE.153 The central issue was whether her registration as
Dominican at birth was improper due to the fact that her parents were
agricultural workers from Haiti.15s The Constitutional Court found that her
identity documents had been properly seized and that nullification
proceedings against her Dominican nationality had been appropriately
initiated under the Constitution.155
In finding that these actions were appropriate and consistent with the
Dominican Constitution, the Constitutional Court provided an analysis
under the title: "The appellant does not derive Dominican nationality
because she is the child of foreigners in transit unless she would otherwise be
stateless."156 The Court provided a four-part analysis in support of its
conclusion that Ms. Deguis had acquired Haitian nationality and would not
be left stateless if she was deprived of her Dominican nationality. 57
Notably, the Court dedicated a substantial part of its analysis to refuting
the Inter-American Court's interpretation of Dominican laws in The Girls
Yean and Bosico.158 The Constitutional Court then provided a statelessness
TC%200275-13%20C.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVQ3-385A] (summarizing the findings in and
grounds of the decision under appeal, Civil y Comercial del Juzgado de Primera Instancia del
Distrito Judicial de San Pedro de Macorils [Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Instance
of the Judicial District of San Pedro de Macoris], Sentencia Ntim. 708-2012 (Nov. 30, 2012)).
149. See TCRD, 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13, pp. 2-4 (summarizing the
findings in the decision under appeal, Cdmara Civil, Comercial y de Trabajo del Juzgado de
Primera Instancia del Distrito Judicial de Monte Plata [Civil, Commercial, and Labor Chamber
of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Monte Plata], Sentencia Nfim. 473/2012
[Judgment No. 473/2012] (2012)).
150. 2010 CONSTITUTION OF THE DOMINIcAN REPUBLIC, Jan. 26, 2010, arts. 184-89.
151. See TCRD, 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13, pp. 53-68 (elaborating on the
meaning of "in transit" under the laws of the Dominican Republic as part of a broader
discussion about the meaning of this exception in the 1966 Constitution).
152. Id. at pp. 99-100 (ordering the JCE to review and revise the birth registry since 1929 to
give effect to the TCRD's interpretation of the "in transit" exception in TC/0168/13).
153. Id. at 3.
154. See id. at 35-36 (describing her parents' status as agricultural workers who registered
her with "fichas," which were the documents provided to such laborers).
155. Id. at 98.
156. Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (author's translation).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 68-75 (concluding, in a section titled The Position of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, that the Inter-American Court committed a "flagrant error of interpretation"
when it relied on a Dominican law from 1939 to suggest that the Dominican Republic should
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analysis, which included reference to the Haitian legal framework, and
concluded that "the appellant d[id] not face a risk of statelessness." 159
The Constitutional Court acknowledged that the 1961 Convention, the
CRC, and the ICCPR each required that the Dominican Republic guarantee
nationality to a child born in its territory that would otherwise be left
stateless.160 However, the Constitutional Court found that this protection
was not triggered in the case of Ms. Deguis. The Court cited the
Constitution of Haiti, which provides that "Haitians of origin are: . . . 2.
Everyone born in foreign territory to a Haitian father or mother." 161 The
Court went on to reiterate that this guarantee of jus sanguinis nationality
was present in Haitian Constitutions spanning more than a century. 162 The
Constitutional Court concluded that Ms. Deguis had acquired Haitian
nationality under the Haitian Constitution, and that the international
protection against statelessness therefore did not apply. 163 The
Constitutional Court went on to highlight that the right to Haitian
nationality was guaranteed through mechanisms for consular birth registry,
and that Ms. Deguis' parents should have registered her birth though the
established process.164
The decision of the Constitutional Court caused international outcry,
and its order requiring Dominican authorities to review the birth registry
and identify persons who had received Dominican nationality in error was
widely viewed as the culmination of the campaign of denationalization.165
The Inter-American Court responded in 2014, in the context of a case that
had been pending against the Dominican Republic before the Inter-
American system for nearly fifteen years.166
limit the "in transit" concept to 10 days).
159. Id. at 75.
160. Id. at 76-77.
161. Id. at 77.
162. See id. at 78 (finding similar provisions in the Constitutions of Haiti from 1843, 1846,
1849, 1867, 1874, 1879, 1888, 1889, 1946, 1957, 1964, 1971, 1983, 1987, and 2011).
163. Id. at 78; see also id. at 79-80 (highlighting that the same logic had been applied by a
Spanish court, which had found that a child born to Dominican parents could not acquire
Spanish nationality under a theory of statelessness protection because the Dominican
Constitution provided for Dominican nationality jus sanguinis).
164. Id. at 81.
165. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l Report on Stateless People in the Dominican Republic, supra note 13,
at 11-21; Human Rights Watch Report on Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality in the Dominican
Republic, supra note 5; Open Soc'y Justice Initiative, Dominican Republic Court Ruling Raises Mass
Statelessness Threat, OPEN SOC'Y FOUNDS. (Oct. 2, 2013),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/press-releases/dominican-republic-court-ruling-
raises-mass-statelessness-threat [https://perma.cc/T3ZK-N3KT].
166. Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, TT 3-
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C. Expelled Dominicans and Haitians vs. Dominican Republic
In Expelled Dominicans and Haitians vs. Dominican Republic, the Inter-
American Court responded to the arguments of the Supreme Court of
Justice and the Constitutional Court that Dominican-born persons of
Haitian descent were not stateless because they derived Haitian nationality
jus sanguinis under the Haitian Constitution. In this instance, the Court
retreated from its earlier position expressed in The Girls Yean and Bosico that
the Dominican Republic left Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent
stateless when it refused to register them as Dominican nationals. In
Expelled Dominicans and Haitians, by contrast, the Inter-American Court
found that the Dominican State had an obligation to resolve the "risk of
statelessness" faced by children of Haitian descent born in its territory,167
and moreover that its failure to do so triggered the obligation to guarantee
Dominican nationality to those persons.168 In this way, the Court extended
the well-established rule that a state must grant its nationality to stateless
children born in its territory, and required protection of children who face a
risk of statelessness. The following discussion closely examines the
reasoning of the Inter-American Court.
Expelled Dominicans and Haitians concerned the practice of collective
expulsion from the Dominican Republic, characterized by the mass
deportation of persons to Haiti without process, based largely on their
physical appearance.1 69 The victims in the case included two individuals
and four families, some of whom were Dominicans with nationality
documents and others who were Dominican-born but who did not have
nationality documents.170 The victims made a range of allegations relating
to their right to nationality, including claims that Dominican officials
deported them without consideration of either their national identity
documents1 71 or the fact that they had been born in the Dominican
Republic.172 The Inter-American Court then analyzed these allegations'
compatibility with the Dominican Republic's obligation to respect the right
to nationality in conjunction with related rights, in particular the principles
of equality and non-discrimination.173
In its decision, the Inter-American Court set forth the legal standards it
167. Id. T 298.
168. Id. T 458.
169. Id. ¶¶ 167-171.
170. Id. TN 65-76 (describing the circumstances of the Medina family, the Fils-Aime family,
Bersson Gelin, Sension Family, Rafaelito Perez Charles, and the Jean family).
171. See id. ¶¶ 201, 221 (citing testimony of Wilian Medina and Rafaelito Perez Charles).
172. See id. T¶ 209-12 (citing testimony of Jeanty Fils-Aime); id. ¶¶ 213-15 (citing testimony
of Bersson Gelin); id. ¶¶ 222-24 (citing testimony of Victor, Miguel, Victoria, and Natalie Jean).
173. The Inter-American Court commonly analyzes certain human rights obligations in
conjunction with one another, as it did in this case where it considered violations of the rights
to juridical personality, to a name, to nationality, and to identity, in relation to the rights of the
child, to equal protection, and the obligations to respect rights without discrimination and to
adopt domestic legal provisions. See id. at ¶¶ 225, 343.
72 [Vol. 19
26
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 19 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol19/iss1/2
The Risk ofStatelessness
would use to analyze the alleged violations of the right to nationality. 174
The Inter-American Court spoke of nationality as a "natural condition of
the human being," which serves as a basis for both political and civil
status.175 The Court acknowledged that, while the power to grant
nationality is within the sovereign purview of a state, states must exercise
that power in accordance with well-established rules of international law.176
The Court then recalled its framework for analysis in The Girls Yean and
Bosico, where it established that states must abide by "their obligation to
prevent, to avoid and to reduce statelessness," and "their obligation to
provide each individual with the equal and effective protection of the law
without discrimination." 17
With regard to the obligation to avoid statelessness, the Court recalled
that states may not adopt practices or laws that tend to create statelessness,
and that this obligation should be assessed at the moment of birth.178 The
Inter-American Court cited the ICCPR and highlighted the Human Rights
Committee's reiteration of the well-established norm that states are
required to take every "appropriate measure" to ensure that children
acquire nationality at birth.179 It further referenced the CRC in emphasizing
this obligation, using it as guidance on the scope and meaning of the right
to nationality guaranteed under the American Convention.1so The Court
recalled its own application of these norms in The Girls Yean and Bosico, and
reiterated that
the condition of being born in the territory of a State is the only one that
needs to be proved in order to acquire nationality, in the case of those
who would not have the right to another nationality if they did not
acquire that of the State where they were born.181
The Court then took a novel jurisprudential step in elaborating the
circumstances that trigger this legal right to nationality in the place of birth.
The Court established that
if the State cannot be certain that a child born in its territory can obtain
the nationality of another State, for example the nationality of a parent
by ius sanguinis, that State has the obligation to grant it nationality (ex
174. Id. ¶¶ 253-64.
175. Id. ¶ 255 (citing Proposed Amendments of the Naturalization Provisions of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, ¶ 32
(Jan. 19, 1984)).
176. Id. ¶ 256.
177. Id. (citing Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, ¶ 140
(Sept. 8, 2005)).
178. Id. 1 257-58.
179. Id. ¶ 258.
180. Id. ¶ 258-61.
181. Id. ¶ 260 (quoting Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 130, T 156 (Sept. 8, 2005)).
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lege, automatically), to avoid a situation of statelessness at birth,
pursuant to Article 20(2) of the American Convention. This obligation
also applies in the hypothesis that the parents cannot (owing to the
existence of [de] facto obstacles) register their children in the State of
their nationality.182
By taking this step, the Court asserted two new potential violations of
the right to nationality under the Convention. First, the Court introduced
the idea that a state must be sure that a child born in its territory has access
to another nationality before it is relieved of the obligation to extend its
own, but failed to provide clarity concerning the degree of certainty
required for such relief. Second, the Court established that a person could
be a national under the law of another jurisdiction at birth while not being
able to access that right in fact, a factor which would inform the foregoing
certainty calculation. Notably, in articulating these standards, the Court
relied on a set of UNHCR statelessness guidelines on state obligations
under the 1961 Convention to ensure a child would not be stateless at
birth.183
With regard to the equal protection of the law, the Court noted that
both direct and indirect practices of discrimination are impermissible under
international human rights law. Violations of this obligation may arise in
cases of "indirect discrimination reflected in the disproportionate impact of
laws, actions, policies or other measures that, even though their wording is
or appears to be neutral, or has a general and undifferentiated scope, have
negative effects on certain vulnerable groups."&I The Court emphasized
that states must "abstain from establishing discriminatory regulations or
regulations that have discriminatory effects on different groups" when
devising the mechanisms for granting nationality.1ss Furthermore, the
Court reiterated its prior conclusion that the obligation not to discriminate
binds states "irrespective of a person's migratory status, and this obligation
extends to the sphere of the right to nationality."18 6
In applying these standards to the victims in Expelled Dominicans and
Haitians, the Court considered the situation of persons who were born in
the Dominican Republic but who had never been registered as
Dominican.187 Among others, the Court reviewed the situation of Victor
Jean and his three children, Victoria, Natalie, and Miguel, all of whom were
born in Dominican territory but were never registered or issued nationality
documents and were subsequently expelled from the country. 188 The Court
182. Id. 1 261 (emphasis in original).
183. Id. (citing UNCHR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, supra note 84, 1 26).
184. Id. ¶ 263 (citing Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, T 234 (Oct. 24, 2012)).
185. Id. ¶ 264.
186. Id. (citing Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, ¶f
155-56 (Sept. 8, 2005)).
187. See id. ¶ 126.
188. Id. ¶ 277.
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approached their lack of documentation as an "omission" by the
Dominican Republic, and examined whether such an omission constituted
a violation of the state's human rights obligations.189
The Dominican state had argued to the Court that Victor Jean and his
children were not entitled to Dominican nationality or documentation, and
that they would not become stateless because they were entitled to Haitian
nationality.'" The Inter-American Court considered that the state's posture
made it unnecessary "to verify factual aspects relating to the alleged
obstacles to obtain documents, or the alleged 'refusal' of the authorities to
grant these." 191 Indeed, the Jeans had made factual allegations that they
were denied their right to register their children's births and obtain identity
documents.192 However, the Dominican State argued that they had no right
to those documents, thereby implicitly affirming the alleged abusive actions
of unnamed civil registry officials. Accordingly, the Court cut directly to
the legality of the state's position.193
The Inter-American Court began this analysis by considering the Jeans'
right to Dominican nationality under the 1955 Dominican Constitution,
which was in place when Victor Jean was born, and under the 1994
Dominican Constitution, which governed at the time of his three children's
births.194 The Court acknowledged that the two constitutions included the
same "in transit" exception, 195 and recalled that the 2003 appeals court
decision that found this exception did not encompass irregular migrants.1 96
The Court observed, however, that the 2004 immigration law had included
irregular migrants within the "in transit" exception,197 and that this
legislation had been subsequently upheld in 2005 by the Dominican
Supreme Court of Justice.1 98 The Court noted that the Dominican
Constitution itself was amended in 2010 to exclude the children of
unauthorized migrants as nationals,199 and that the Constitutional Court in
2013 interpreted the provisions of every constitution dating back to 1929 in
a manner consistent with the standard set forth in the 2010 Constitution.200
The Court noted that the state's argument with regard to the alleged
discriminatory effects of the broadened and retroactively applied "in
transit" exception was consistent with the 2005 Supreme Court decision
and the 2013 Constitutional Court decision.201 It further acknowledged that
such legal developments were not discriminatory per se. 202 The Court then
189. Id. ¶ 278.
190. Id. ¶ 279.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 74 n.258.
193. Id. 1 279.
194. Id. ¶¶ 280, 297.
195. Id. ¶ 280
196. Id. ¶ 281.
197. Id. ¶ 282.
198. Id. ¶ 283.
199. Id. ¶ 284.
200. Id. ¶¶ 285-88.
201. Id. ¶ 293.
202. Id. 1¶ 289-92.
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recalled its own decision in The Girls Yean and Bosico, and suggested that the
overly broad interpretation of "in transit" was not reasonable, and that the
state needed to apply a more limited time frame in order to comply with its
human rights obligations.203 In an important analytical turn, the Inter-
American Court then disengaged with its anti-discrimination analysis and
focused on whether the state's refusal to register the Jean family and to
grant them nationality documents violated their right to nationality under
the law of statelessness.20
The Court indicated that the Dominican Republic had recognized that it
would be required under international law to grant Dominican nationality
to the Jeans if they were stateless. 205 It then examined the state's argument
that the Jeans were not stateless because they had the right to obtain
Haitian nationality.206 In its discussion, the Court emphasized that the mere
claim by the Dominican Republic that the Jeans could acquire Haitian
nationality under the Haitian Constitution jus sanguinis was insufficient to
demonstrate that they were not stateless. According to the Court, this claim
was insufficient because "the State has not proved that the presumed
victims who never obtained Dominican nationality are, in fact, able to
obtain Haitian nationality." 207 Notably, the Court considered the state to
have the burden of proving that the Jeans would be able to exercise any
right to nationality in Haiti.
The Inter-American Court never specifically explained its decision to
place this burden on the Dominican Republic, but the Court did provide
some clues in the framing of its analysis. First, the Court stated at the outset
that it would be analyzing the "omission" of the Dominican Republic in
declining to document the Jeans.208 While the Court did not cite any specific
authority to support the idea that the state should bear the burden in
justifying such an omission, this framing provides some insight. Second, the
Court introduced the notion that a state has the obligation to be sure that a
child born in its territory can acquire another nationality, and that the state
must consider de facto barriers to acquiring the other nationality. 209
Together, the omission by the state to issue documentation, combined with
its obligation to confirm that the Jeans had acquired another nationality,
presumably justified placing the burden on the state to demonstrate that
the Jeans were not stateless.
In support of the position that the state had not met its burden, the
Court referred to "certain well-known public information" about the
203. Id. N 294.
204. See ¶¶ 295-301; see also NJ 302-25 (finding separately that the Dominican Republic had
discriminatorily deprived the Jeans of their right to nationality with the succession of laws,
policies, and judicial rulings, under Article 2 of the American Convention, and left them
without Dominican nationality, in violation of Article 20, without making explicit reference to
the law of statelessness).
205. Id. 1 296.
206. Id. ¶ 297.
207. Id.
208. Id. ¶ 278.
209. Id. ¶ 261.
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Haitian legal framework.210 The Court reviewed the 1957 Haitian
Constitution, effective at the time of Victor Jean's birth, and noted that it
provided for nationality jus sanguinis to the child of a Haitian father born
abroad. 211 However, because filiation had not been established for Victor
Jean, the Court found that there existed the possibility that Haiti would not
consider him a Haitian national. 212 The 1987 Haitian Constitution, in effect
at the time of the Jean children's births, provided jus sanguinis nationality to
a child born abroad to either a Haitian father or mother.213 At the same
time, the Court pointed out a 1984 law that prevented children born abroad
to a Haitian mother and foreign father from acquiring Haitian nationality
until the age of 18.214 The Court indicated that the effect of the 1984 law on
the 1987 Constitution had not been established, and that Victor Jean could
have been considered "foreign" under the Haitian Constitution because the
nationality of his father had never been established. 215
The Court acknowledged that it was not in a position to make a
pronouncement on the operation of Haitian law;216 rather, it was "merely
demonstrating, based on certain public information, that the State's
argument that the presumed victims could acquire Haitian nationality
would have required greater substantiation to support it."217 On this basis,
the Court concluded that "this would entail the risk of statelessness for the
presumed victims, because the State has not proved sufficiently that these
persons would obtain another nationality."218 The Court concluded that the
Dominican Republic had retroactively applied norms concerning the legal
certainty of the Jeans' right to nationality, that they faced a risk of
statelessness when it did so, and that the Dominican state had therefore
arbitrarily violated their right to nationality. 219
Three points warrant particular emphasis with regard to this most
recent iteration of the statelessness debate between the Inter-American
Court and the Dominican justice system. First, the Inter-American Court
did not declare the Jeans stateless. This is particularly important, because it
represents a shift in its position in The Girls Yean and Bosico, where it found
that the two girls had been left stateless after Dominican authorities had
denied them birth certificates. Second, the Court placed the burden on the
Dominican Republic to demonstrate that the Jeans were not stateless at
birth. Finally, the Court considered some possible interpretations of Haitian
law in concluding that the Jeans faced a risk of statelessness, triggering the
rule of law that a person must acquire the nationality of the place of birth if






216. See id. (" [I]t should be clarified that this does not mean that the Court, in the context of
this case, is examining the laws of Haiti.").
217. Id.
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she does not have a right to any other nationality.
When understood in these terms, the decision of the Inter-American
Court in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians expands statelessness protection
through a mandatory grant of nationality in the place of birth to persons
who face a "risk of statelessness." Indeed, the Inter-American Court did not
find that the Jeans were stateless, but rather that under a possible
interpretation of Haitian law, they faced a risk of statelessness. By requiring
the Dominican Republic to extend Dominican nationality whenever it had
not adequately addressed such a risk, the Court effectively extended
statelessness protection to persons that had not been declared stateless.
The decision of the Inter-American Court to expand the right to
nationality in the place of birth under the American Convention to persons
who face a risk of statelessness is a notable normative development. The
next section provides a critique of this rule, arguing that it unnecessarily
extended a well-established rule of protection, and that policy implications
of this extension may cause the Court's well-intentioned progressive
development of norms to backfire.
III. CONSIDERING RISK WITHIN THE STATELESSNESs DETERMINATION PROCESS
When the Inter-American Court extended protection under the
international law of statelessness to persons who face a risk of statelessness,
it expanded the scope of a well-established rule limited to the protection of
stateless persons.220 Gerald L. Neuman has criticized the Inter-American
Court for "undervalu[ing] the consent of the relevant community of states
as a factor in the interpretation of a human rights treaty" when it utilizes
international human rights norms to interpret the American Convention. 221
Neuman has suggested that this "neglect" both distorts human rights
norms and potentially undermines the effectiveness of the regional human
rights system.222 Neuman's critique can be applied to the Inter-American
Court's interpretation of international obligations under the law of
statelessness in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians. Arguably, the Inter-
American Court's decision distorts norms of statelessness protection, and
potentially undermines the effectiveness of the Inter-American system in its
effort to combat statelessness. These deleterious consequences can be
avoided by the Inter-American Court and other international authorities if
they remain anchored to the well-established rule of protection for stateless
persons, while incorporating a risk assessment into the determination of
statelessness.
The first sub-section below describes the exact nature of the normative
distortion in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians, and provides the reasoned
solution of including a risk assessment as part of a statelessness
220. See supra Section II.C.
221. Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of




Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 19 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol19/iss1/2
The Risk of Statelessness
determination. It argues that the Inter-American Court's "risk of
statelessness" is analogous to de facto statelessness, which is a status
unprotected under the international law of statelessness. A protracted
debate in the current campaign to eradicate statelessness has recently
concluded with broad acceptance that de jure-rather than de facto-
statelessness is the appropriate trigger for protection under the law of
statelessness. Backsliding on the commitment to de jure statelessness could
chill the steadily increasing support among states for legal protection for
stateless persons, which is the principal aim of the campaign described in
the first section of this Article.
The next sub-section outlines the steps in determining statelessness and
considers the challenges inherent in this determination in the Dominican-
Haitian context. Highlighting the appropriate legal and factual inquiries, it
lays out the ambiguities in Haitian jus sanguinis nationality law as well as
the challenges faced by persons who seek nationality solutions from
Haitian public authorities. Recognizing that the concerns regarding the risk
of statelessness are valid, this section demonstrates how the legal and
factual challenges raised by the Inter-American Court in Expelled Haitians
and Dominicans can be addressed in a statelessness determination process.
Finally, the last part of this Article discusses the challenge of
identifying the appropriate level of risk that should trigger a finding of
statelessness. In the absence of any law on point, and minimal guidance,
this Article argues that a person who is more likely than not stateless
should be considered a stateless person under the 1954 Convention, and
thus should be protected with a grant of nationality in the place of birth as
envisioned by the 1961 Convention. This recommendation accounts for
important policy considerations such as the history of sovereign control
over nationality as well as the tentative start to the campaign to eradicate
global statelessness. Ultimately, it is animated by the universal and
fundamental nature of the human right to nationality and the drastic
consequences of a rule that would permit a greater chance of statelessness
before the protection of nationality in the place of birth would apply.
A. Avoiding the De Facto Statelessness Dilemma
As the first section of this Article illustrated, the 1954 Convention
defines a "stateless person" as one who is "not considered as a national by
any state under the operation of its law."a This definition is also referred
to as de jure statelessness, and it stands in contrast to de facto statelessness,
which generally refers to persons who are nationals under the operation of
laws of some country, but who do not receive the rights and privileges of
such legal status. The consensus is that states are compelled to assist de jure
stateless persons under the law of statelessness, and they are merely
223. 1954 Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
792017]
33
Baluarte: The Risk of Statelessness: Reasserting a Rule for the Protection
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
encouraged to assist those who are de facto stateless. 224 The likeness
between de facto statelessness and the Inter-American Court's "risk of
statelessness" doctrine compels further examination, with important
implications for statelessness protection.
The historical context in which the 1954 Convention was ultimately
promulgated is an important starting point for this presentation of the de
facto statelessness dilemma. As discussed above, the international
community was animated by a concern for "unprotected" persons when it
convened to deliberate about legal protection for refugees and stateless
persons after the Second World War. Refugees were unprotected as a
matter of fact, while stateless persons were unprotected as a matter of law.
Notably, the refugee definition set forth in the 1951 Convention did not
encompass all people who were factually unprotected; rather, it was aimed
at protecting only those who feared persecution in their country because of
some protected characteristic.m The 1954 Convention, on the other hand,
extended protection to all persons who were legally unprotected by virtue
of their lack of a nationality link to any country.
In arriving at the definition of "stateless person," the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons discussed
the de facto statelessness concept at length.2 6 There was a suggestion that
an expansive idea of de facto statelessness should be incorporated into the
definition of stateless person. Specifically, the United Kingdom argued for a
broad understanding of de facto statelessness, which would include
persons who were "refused" or "deprived" of protection by their state of
nationality.227 The Conference did not take up this suggestion. Ultimately,
while the precise term "de facto stateless" does not appear anywhere in the
body of the Convention,22 8 the Final Act encouraged each state party to
provide the protection of the Convention in cases "when it recognizes as
valid the reasons for which a person has renounced the protection of the
State of which he is a national." 229 Notably, this provision only covered
persons who had renounced the protection of their country of nationality,
and the instrument did not create any obligation to protect such persons.
A Conference that convened in 1959, and then again in 1961 to finish its
work on the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, also
demonstrated some concern about de facto statelessness.230 Again, that
Conference declined to include any binding legal obligations for state
parties to protect de facto stateless persons.231 Rather, it included a
recommendation in its Final Act that "persons who are stateless de facto
224. See, e.g., VAN WAAS, supra note 79, at 19-27; Massey, supra note 28, at 17, 23; Jason E.
Tucker, Questioning De Facto Statelessness by Looking at De Facto Citizenship, 19 TILBURG L. REV.
277, 277-78 (2014).
225. See 1951 Convention, supra note 73, art. 1(A).
226. Massey, supra note 28, at 17.
227. Id. at 18.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 17.
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should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to
acquire effective nationality." 232 This suggested that states could -but were
not required to -develop rules on nationality acquisition and deprivation
that would reduce the likelihood that persons would become de facto
stateless.233
In the context of the Final Act of the 1961 Convention, de facto
statelessness appeared to have taken on a different meaning than de facto
statelessness in the Final Act of the 1954 Convention. While no definition
was provided, commentary by the UNHCR at the Conference suggested
that de facto statelessness meant ineffective nationality, or that one had a
nationality link but did not enjoy all of the rights associated with
citizenship.2" Even so, there was some recognition of the difficulty in
distinguishing between de jure and de facto statelessness. Paul Weis, who
represented the UNHCR at the Conference, highlighted the existence of
"many cases where a person's nationality status cannot be established,
where it is doubtful, undetermined or unknown," making the distinction
between legal and factual statelessness "difficult to draw."2 3 5
Indeed, while some cases of statelessness are clear, namely where there
is simply no domestic nationality law regime that could be interpreted to
extend nationality to an individual, there are other cases in which a
determination of legal versus factual statelessness requires closer
examination. Laura van Waas has surveyed the many uses of de facto
statelessness, and suggested that this term is generally used to describe one
of three situations: 1) where a person is generally deprived of the rights
associated with nationality, 2) "where a person's nationality is contested or
disputed," and 3) where a person is "unable to . . . prove his or her
nationality." 26
Van Waas notes that the first category has historically been referred to
as "ineffective nationality," which she defines as "not enjoy[ing] the rights
of citizenship enjoyed by other non-criminal citizens of the same state."237
Van Waas suggests that this category of de facto statelessness is
amorphous, inasmuch as it could reasonably encompass anyone whose
human rights have been violated, and argues that the human rights
machinery is better suited to address issues of ineffective nationality.?
232. Id. (quoting U.N. Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness,
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness,
Res. 1, A/CONF.9/14/Add.1 (Aug. 29,1961)).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 24.
235. Statement by Paul Weis to the United Nations Conference on the Elimination or
Reduction of Future Statelessness (Aug. 25, 1961) (as quoted in Carol A. Batchelor, Stateless
Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 232, 252 (1995)); see also U.N.
Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, Summary Record of the
Twenty-Third Plenary Meeting: Held at Headquarters, New York
on Friday, 25 August 1961, at 10:30 a.m., A/CONF.9/SR.23, at 13-14 (Oct. 11, 1961)
(summarizing the statement by Paul Weis).
236. VAN WAAS, supra note 80, at 24.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 24-25. This position, set forth by van Waas, is also supported by Hugh Massey,
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Generally, the literature on statelessness has accepted van Waas's
contention that statelessness protection is inappropriate in cases of
ineffective nationality, and that this challenge is better raised with the
country of nationality as a violation of human rights.239
Meanwhile, the other two de facto statelessness scenarios where
citizenship is disputed or cannot be established echo the "risk of
statelessness" that triggered statelessness protection in the Inter-American
Court decision. In that case, the Inter-American Court highlighted the
ambiguity in how different rules under Haitian constitutions and decrees
would be resolved, raising concerns about the need to establish filiation in
order to qualify for nationality. 240 This is clearly a case of disputed
nationality, which falls into the second category of de facto statelessness
described by van Waas. According to van Waas, the appropriate next step
would be a statelessness determination to decide whether international
protection under the law of statelessness is appropriate. 241 Similarly, the
charge in the cases of "risk of statelessness" would be to complete a
statelessness determination.
When the Inter-American Court extended statelessness protection to
persons who were arguably de facto stateless, it extended the protection of
that body of law beyond its well-settled limits. The next step for the Inter-
American Court after identifying the Jeans' "risk of statelessness" should
have been to make a determination of statelessness. If it had found the
Jeans to be stateless at birth, then the Dominican Republic - by its own
admission-would have been obliged to provide them with nationality
documents. As an explanation for why it did not take this course of action,
the Inter-American Court only noted that the Dominican Republic had the
burden to prove that the Jeans could acquire Haitian nationality, and had
failed to meet this burden due to potentially conflicting, or ambiguous,
Haitian laws.242 The Court thus fell short of disproving Haitian nationality,
or explicitly demonstrating statelessness. As such, it lacked the proper basis
under the international law of statelessness to compel Dominican
nationality.
The next section provides a framework for considering the statelessness
determination that the Inter-American Court failed to make. The goal of
this section is both to advance the argument that a statelessness
determination is necessary in order to extend statelessness protection to
Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent, and to recognize the potential
Senior Legal Advisor at UNHCR Geneva, who writes that "there is no need for a special
statelessness regime to address the problem of denial of rights attached to nationality as such
problems are already covered by the international human rights regime." Massey, supra note
28, at 39.
239. See e.g., Tucker, supra note 224, at 277-278; Massey, supra note 28, at 39-40.
240. Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, T 297
(Aug. 28, 2014).
241. VAN WAAS, supra note 80, at 25-26.
242. Expelled Dominicans and Haitians 1 297 (finding that the Dominican Republic had not
proven that the Jeans were able to obtain Haitian nationality as a matter of fact).
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significance of the risk assessment suggested by the Inter-American Court
in making that determination.
B. Returning to the Statelessness Determination
A statelessness determination is a complex matter that may involve
scrutinizing evidence from multiple jurisdictions and assessing that
evidence under different legal frameworks. 243 While a statelessness
determination should be necessary to extend the protection of the
international law of statelessness to Dominicans of Haitian descent, there
are substantial challenges. First, determining whether a person is "not
considered as a national of any state under the operation of its laws"
requires 1) identification of the appropriate legal framework of each
jurisdiction; 244 and 2) a determination of how state authorities apply that
law in practice. Inasmuch as one of the central critiques of this Article is
that the Inter-American Court extended statelessness protection in Expelled
Dominicans and Haitians without completing such a determination, 245 the
following discussion will explore some of the challenges that may have
deterred the Court.
With regard to the inquiry into the relevant law of each jurisdiction,
UNHCR guidance provides that "laws" include not just legislation, but also
"ministerial decrees, regulations, [and] orders," as well as case law and
customary practice where appropriate. 246 Of particular importance in this
regard is that some laws operate automatically, while others do not. In
essence, automatic nationality acquisition is triggered by the mere presence
of a circumstance or event, "such as birth on a territory or birth to nationals
of a state," whereas non-automatic modes of acquisition require an
additional act of an individual or the state.247
While the analysis of both the Inter-American Court and Dominican
courts into Dominican law has been quite detailed, the analysis of Haitian
law by these courts has been superficial. However, a detailed review of
Haitian nationality law is absolutely necessary if there is to be any clarity
243. UNHCR, Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, 1 18, 23 (June 30, 2014),
http://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/04/CH-
UNHCR_- Handbook-on-Protection-of-Stateless-Persons.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S5L-W2FK]
[hereinafter UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons].
244. A preliminary step, not addressed here in detail, is to identify all those States with
which an individual has a "relevant link, in particular by birth on the territory, descent,
marriage, adoption or habitual residence." Id. T 18. Guidance by the UJNHCR does not
elaborate on what constitutes a "relevant link," but the clear implication is that "relevant" is a
fairly low standard, such that a country should be considered if there is some articulable
connection between that jurisdiction and the individual seeking a determination of
statelessness.
245. See Expelled Dominicans and Haitians 1 297 (noting that the Court was not, "in this
context, examining the laws of Haiti"); id. ¶ 279 (finding it unnecessary "to verify factual
aspects relating to the alleged obstacles to obtain documents, or the alleged 'refusal' of the
authorities to grant these").
246. UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 243, T 22.
247. Id. ¶ 26.
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about the situation of statelessness in Hispaniola. A review of Haitian
nationality law between 1929 and 2010 - the period during which birthright
nationality in the Dominican Republic was qualified by the "in transit"
exception -reveals three distinct legal regimes whose potentially
overlapping operation creates some level of uncertainty.248
First, as the Inter-American Court noted in its brief review of Victor
Jean's nationality claim, there are certain constitutions that reserve the right
to jus sanguinis nationality acquisition for those born to Haitian fathers.249
The 1946 Constitution provided that a Haitian father could pass on his
Haitian nationality to a child born in foreign territory, and that a Haitian
mother could pass on her Haitian nationality to a child if the father did not
recognize the child.250 By its terms, this rule would prevent a Haitian
mother from transferring her Haitian nationality to a child born in foreign
territory if her foreign partner recognized the child.251 This same rule was
reasserted in the 1957 Constitution,252 and that regime remained in place
until the 1964 Constitution provided a basis for jus sanguinis nationality
acquisition for children born to a Haitian father or mother, regardless of
whether the father recognized the child.2 5 3 The gender distinction in the
1946 and 1957 Constitutions was once again made law by a 1974 Decree,254
248. While not appropriately considered a legal regime, it is important to note that prior to
1946 there is virtually no guidance on jus sanguinis rules of Haitian nationality acquisition. The
Haitian Constitution of 1918 only mentions citizenship or nationality requirements on one
occasion: "The rules governing nationality shall be determined by law." 1918 CONSTITUTION DE
LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAlTI [1918 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI], June 19, 1918, art. 3,
translated in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1918, at 487 (1918). However, no nationality laws are publically available from this
period, so there is very little clarity about what it meant to hold nationality under the law.
Further, the 1928 constitutional amendments did not address nationality. See generally
CONSTITUTION DE 1918 DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI AMENDPE PAR LE PlUBISCITE DES 10 ET 11
JANVIER 1928 [1928 AMENDMENTS TO THE 1918 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI], Jan.
10-11, 1928, art. 3. While the 1935 Constitution made an important distinction between
"Haitians by origin" and "Haitians by naturalization," see 1935 CONSTITUTION DE LA
REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI [1935 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI], June 2, 1935, art. 6
(translation on file with author), neither the text of that Constitution nor constitutional
amendments in 1944 defined these terms.
249. Expelled Dominicans and Haitians 1 297.
250. 1946 CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI [1946 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF HAITI], Nov. 22,1946, art. 4.
251. Article 4 of 1946 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti provides that "[olne is a Haitian
by origin if he is born to a father who was himself born Haitian. Or, one is a Haitian by origin
if he is not recognized by his father but he was born to a mother who herself was born
Haitian." Id. (translation on file with author).
252. 1957 CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI [1957 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF HAITI], June 14, 1957, art. 4.
253. 1964 CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HATI [1964 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF HAITI], May 25, 1964, art. 4.
254. D~cret du 27 F6vrier 1974 sur la Nationalit6 et la Naturalisation [Feb. 27, 1974 Decree
on Nationality and Naturalization], art. 2, Le Moniteur No. 20, Mar. 14, 1974 (Haiti). The legal
force of this Decree is uncertain, inasmuch as it contradicts the Constitution in force at the
time, even though there is no public guidance available on this apparent inconsistency in the
law. The 1974 Decree also introduced, for the first time, rules for loss of Haitian nationality.
Most important, Article 17 states that Haitian nationality is incompatible with all other
nationalities and no one may hold a double nationality where one of the nationalities is
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and that rule remained in force at least until the passage of the 1983
Constitution.
Second, from 1983 until 1987, Haitian nationality would only pass jus
sanguinis if both parents were Haitian.255 Notably, from 1984 until at least
1987, the child of a Haitian mother and a foreign father born abroad could
only acquire Haitian nationality at the age of eighteen if the child returned
to Haiti. 256 Nevertheless, worth noting is that this slightly more permissive
rule would not necessarily guarantee the right to acquire Haitian
nationality at birth.257
Third, from 1974 until 2010 there was a ban on dual nationality.?
Under this rule, a person who "opted for another nationality" was not
considered Haitian. This raises questions about when a person born in the
Dominican Republic to Haitian parents may have "opted for another
nationality." Most likely, a person would be considered to have opted for
another nationality in the Dominican Republic if that person had acquired a
Dominican birth certificate or other national identity document from
Dominican authorities. It is also possible that a person born in the
Dominican Republic who attempted to acquire such documents thereby
sought to exercise his or her right to birthright nationality and opted for
another nationality.
Accordingly, there are at least three distinct regimes for jus sanguinis
nationality acquisition throughout the period from 1929-2010, and at least
two scenarios for how these three regimes could operate as a matter of law.
Under one scenario, newer constitutions could trump older constitutions,
Haitian. Id. art. 17.
255. See CONSTITUTION DE 1983 DE DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI [1983 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF HAITI], art. 11. Article 11 states that a Haitian is "1) [alnyone born in Haiti to [a]
Haitian father or Haitian mother; 2) [a]nyone born in a foreign country to a Haitian father and
a Haitian mother; [and] 3) [a]nyone born in Haiti to a foreign father or, if the father does not
recognize the child, to a foreign mother, as long as he is of the black race, is Haitian." Id.
(translation on file with author) (emphasis added).
256. See D&cret du 6 Novembre 1984 sur la Nationalit6 Haitienne [Nov. 6, 1984 Decree on
Haitian Nationality], arts. 7 & 8, Le Moniteur No. 78, Nov. 8, 1984 (Haiti).
257. Specifically, Articles 7 and 8 of the 1984 Decree state that a child born abroad to a
foreign father and a Haitian mother will keep the foreign nationality until their age of
majority, at which time the child can return to Haiti and claim Haitian nationality by making a
declaration before the civil court of his residence. Id.
258. See Feb. 27, 1974 Decree on Nationality and Naturalization, supra note 254, art. 17
(stating that Haitian nationality is incompatible with all other nationalities and no one may
hold a double nationality where one of the nationalities is Haitian); see also 1983 CONSTITUTION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, Aug. 27, 1983, art. 18 (proclaiming that "[diouble nationality can be
recognized by bilateral or multilateral convention but is reserved to Haitians who have never
opted for another nationality") (translation on file with author); 1987 CONSTITUTION DE LA
REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI [1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI], Mar. 29, 1987, art. 15. The
2012 amendment to the 1987 Constitution created the current law that applies to all Haitian
people: "Every Haitian is subject to the rights, privileges, and duties attached to Haitian
nationality, except for those privileges reserved to Haitians by origin. No Haitian can uphold a
foreign nationality on Haitian territory." CONSTITUTION DF LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI
[CONSTITUTION OF THE RFPUBLIC OF HAITI] June 19, 2012, art. 12 (translation on file with
author), amended by LOI CONSTITUTIONNELLE PORTANT AMENDEMENT DE LA CONSTITUTION DE
1987 [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE 1987 HAITIAN CONSTITUTION].
852017]
39
Baluarte: The Risk of Statelessness: Reasserting a Rule for the Protection
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
such that the only relevant rule is that provided by the 1987 Constitution.
Alternatively, the constitution in effect at the time of an individual's birth
could govern that individual's claim to Haitian nationality.259 Notably, the
constitutions themselves are not clear on the question of how they relate to
one another, and public guidance is scarce.
Regardless, demonstrating eligibility under the relevant legal
framework likely requires both a legal showing as well as evidence of the
parents' nationality. This is particularly important if the date of one's birth
determines which constitutional framework for jus sanguinis nationality
acquisition applies, because it matters at different points which parent had
Haitian nationality. Such uncertainty makes it difficult to determine which
children of Haitian migrants might be nationals "under the operation of
[Haitian] law," and therefore complicates a determination of statelessness.
Moreover, this uncertainty is compounded by challenges related to the
capacity of Haitian officials and institutions to effectively interpret and
apply these laws.
Indeed, the next step in determining whether a person is "considered"
a national is to conduct a "careful analysis of how a state applies its
nationality laws." 260 Accordingly, a statelessness determination requires not
only reading laws and considering how they operate, but also
understanding how the laws are applied in practice.261 UNHCR guidance
acknowledges that competent authorities are often charged with assessing
evidence and making a determination of whether to grant an individual
automatic nationality. 262 Such competent authorities may interpret certain
evidence as insufficient, regardless of an apparent automatic right to
nationality under the law. UNHCR guidance suggests that, in such cases,
the conclusion of the competent authority, rather than the black letter law
itself, should be considered determinative on the question of whether a
person is "considered as a national" of the state.263
To the extent that Haitian officials are called upon to "consider" the
claims to nationality of persons born in the Dominican Republic, there is
evidence that limitations in the capacity of public institutions may also
contribute to a risk of statelessness. Official recognition of Haitian nationals
born abroad suffers from challenges related to Haiti's institutional fragility,
especially after the 2010 earthquake. 264 A foreign birth must be documented
259. This was assumed by the Inter-American Court in its "risk of statelessness" analysis
in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians where it applied different constitutional regimes in
analyzing Victor Jean's case and those of his children. See Case of Expelled Dominicans and
Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, ¶ 297 (Aug. 28, 2014).
260. UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 243, 1 23.
261. Id. T 24.
262. Id. ¶ 36.
263. Id. ¶ 37.
264. Catherine A. Tobin, No Child is an Island: The Predicament of Statelessness for Children in
the Caribbean, 1 DEPAUL INTL HUM. RTs. L.J. 1, 6 n. 32 (2015); UNHCR, Div. of Int'l Prot,
Human Rights Liaison Unit, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report -
Universal Periodic Review: Haiti, at 3 & n.3 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter 2011 UNHCR Submission
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by Haitian authorities, and this official act relies in part on the
documentation of that child's parents in Haiti.265 Once the parents'
nationalities have been confirmed, a consular officer is charged with
registering the foreign birth for purposes of nationality.266 However,
problems can arise at many points in this process.
In addition, during Haiti's Universal Periodic Review in 2011, the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees submitted
testimony regarding the dysfuncion of the civil registry system and the
ability of civil authorities to verify the identity of Haitian nationals
abroad. 267 Haiti's civil registry suffers from limited financial resources and a
lack of clarity in applicable regulatory frameworks. 268 The result has been a
failure on the part of the Haitian state to register the births of generations of
Haitians, and this failure has compounded problems associated with
registering births abroad. 269
Haitian consular officials, to the extent that they must verify claims to
Haitian nationality abroad, inherit the problems of the civil registry in
Haiti.270 Moreover, Haitian consular officials face an additional problem of
needing to interpret and apply Haiti's nationality law, with all the
accompanying uncertainties outlined above. As evidence of the challenges
these officials face, the UNHCR has reported inconsistent responses in a
survey of four Haitian consulates in countries with the highest Haitian
migrant populations. 271 The exact implications of such arbitrary application
of the law are yet to be studied, but the unpredictability of the process is
evident.
The very nature of these ambiguities in the law, coupled with the
for Haiti's Universal Periodic Review], http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d8869932.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JDV6-M7RC].
265. See 2010 Open Society Report on Dominicans of Haitian Descent, supra note 143, at 7-8; see
also TCRD, 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13, pp. 80-82 (explaining processes of
registration for Haitian births abroad, as dictated by D6cret du 27 F6vrier 1974 sur la
Nationalit6 et la Naturalisation [Feb. 27, 1974 Decree on Nationality and Naturalization], art. 2,
Le Moniteur No. 20, Mar. 14, 1974 (Haiti). Lkgislation du 14 September 1958 sur les
Attributions du Consul [Sept. 14, 1958 Legislation on Attributions of Consular Service], Le
Moniteur No. 78-141 (Dec. 29, 1958) (Haiti)).
266. See 2010 Open Society Report on Dominicans of Haitian Descent, supra note 143, at 8; see
also TCRD, 25 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13, pp. 95-96 (Dom. Rep.) (explaining the
foreign birth registration process in the Dominican Republic). For further discussion of these
processes and their problems, see chapter III of Human Rights Watch Report on Arbitrary
Deprivation of Nationality in the Dominican Republic, supra note 5.
267. See 2011 UNHCR Submission for Haiti's Universal Periodic Review, supra note 264, at
2-3.
268. Tobin, supra note 264, at 6 & n.32, 11.
269. Id. at 6.
270. Id. at 11.
271. See 2011 UNHCR Submission for Haiti's Universal Periodic Review, supra note 264, at
3 (noting that a 2008 UNHCR survey showed disagreement among Haitian consular officials
in "how far . . . lineage rights could extend to grant nationality"). Difficulties with the
implementation of a 2014 Haitian government initiative that attempted to resolve document
requests for some "300,000 irregular migrants living in the Dominican Republic" further
demonstrated "the ongoing disorganization of the Haitian civil registration system." Tobin,
supra note 264, at 6.
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institutional uncertainty in applying rules of law, suggests that a
statelessness determination may not yield a clear response. However, the
fundamental nature of the right to nationality and the need for resolution of
such matters may require a determination of statelessness whether the
inquiry into statelessness gives a clear answer or not. In these
circumstances, the risk of statelessness might be so manifest as to require a
finding that a person is stateless for purposes of protection under
international law.
C. A Role for the Risk of Statelessness
As the previous section elaborated, there are at least two ways in which
a risk of statelessness might influence the outcome of a statelessness
determination at birth. First, when laws from multiple jurisdictions operate
at the moment of a child's birth and questions arise as to the applicability of
related laws or regulations, the child may face a risk of statelessness.
Second, even if there is clarity about how each legal regime operates, wide
discretion afforded to the authorities competent to make a nationality
determination, or a record of arbitrary application of the law, may create a
risk of statelessness. Practically speaking, complex questions of fact and law
may be impossible to resolve in a timely manner when a child is born and
needs the security of a nationality. In complex cases where component
authorities are responsive and apply the law in a predictable manner, the
risk of statelessness may be negligible. In other cases, complexity combined
with unresponsive officials who apply murky rules of law inconsistently
may result in a high risk of statelessness. This final section argues that a
person who is more likely than not stateless should qualify as a "stateless
person" under international law.
The UNHCR has recognized that the importance of guaranteeing the
right of everyone to a nationality balanced against the difficulty of proving
nationality in some circumstances requires that the standard for
establishing statelessness be less than certainty. Specifically, the UNHCR
Statelessness Handbook provides that the standard of proof for a statelessness
determination is to establish to a "reasonable degree" that an individual
would be stateless. 272 The UNHCR has further suggested that the
"reasonable degree" standard is the same standard that it utilizes in making
refugee status determinations. 273 The UNHCR does not, however, explain
why the standard for a refugee status determination and a statelessness
determination should be the same.
There are a number of compelling reasons for applying a shared
standard. For example, the shared history of the protection regimes for
refugees and stateless persons supports the use of a common standard of
proof. Indeed, if the concern that prompted the two protection regimes was
272. See UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 243, ¶ 91;
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, supra note 84, T 21.
273. UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 243, ¶ 91 (2014).
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that persons were "unprotected," then a similar risk of being either
factually unprotected (refugee) or legally unprotected (stateless) would
trigger protected status. Moreover, there is an efficiency consideration,
inasmuch as a shared standard would capitalize on the already extensive
experience of states with refugee protection,274 as well as that of
international and national tribunals in adjudicating refugee relief.275
From a practical point of view, a shared standard would mean that a
person seeking statelessness protection would need to demonstrate a risk of
statelessness in the same manner that a refugee needs to demonstrate a risk
of persecution. A sufficient risk of statelessness would lead to a conclusion
that a person is stateless, just as a sufficient risk of persecution results in
refugee status. While the shared standard is attractive for the reasons
provided, this approach poses both legal and policy challenges that must be
reconciled.
The principal challenge posed by a shared standard is that the language
of the relevant conventions is not analogous. The 1951 Refugee Convention
protects a person as a refugee when she demonstrates a well-founded fear
of persecution in her country of nationality. 276 The notion of a "well-
founded fear" implicitly refers to a level of risk. Indeed, much has been
written on this formulation, and some have advanced the position that this
suggests a one in ten chance of persecution.27 The question is whether a
10% risk of statelessness is similarly sustainable as a standard of proof to
find someone to be a stateless person protected by international law.
The 1954 Convention protects a person as stateless if she is not
"considered" a national under the "operation of laws" of any country. This
language suggests, and the discussion above confirms, a degree of
discretion in how officials "consider" requests and interpret the "operation
of laws." While this may produce uncertainty, the balance of probabilities is
not as implicit in the statelessness definition as it is in the refugee
definition. However, the difficulties inherent in proving statelessness
support the notion that statelessness to a certainty should not be the
standard. 278 The question then is whether the same "reasonable degree"
standard from refugee law should be applied in the statelessness context.
274. UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 (Dec. 2011) (noting in the refugee status
determination context, an individual can claim a well-founded fear of persecution by
establishing "to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has
become intolerable to him for reasons stated in the [refugee] definition").
275. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (finding that a well-founded fear of
persecution is a 10% likelihood, based in part on the writing of international refugee law
scholars).
276. 1951 Convention, supra note 74, art. 1(A)(2).
277. The United States Supreme Court, for example, considered the writings of
international refugee law scholars and found that "[t]here is simply no room in the United
Nations' definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being
shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no 'well-founded fear' of the event
happening." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
278. UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 243, ¶ 91.
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With no clear guidance on this point other than that provided by the
UNHCR, one possible interpretation can be derived from the relationship
between statelessness protection and the human right to nationality.
The most fundamental statement of the human right to nationality is
that everyone must have one. Moreover, nationality under the law is binary
in that a person either has a nationality or does not have a nationality, and
is stateless. Despite insightful observations that some nationalities seem to
have more heft than others, 279 legal statelessness is the only alternative to
nationality under the law. Together, the declaration that everyone must
have a nationality and the fact that without one a person is stateless,
suggest that statelessness protection cannot tolerate a situation in which a
person is more likely stateless than in possession of a nationality. The
natural conclusion is that anything more than a 50% chance of statelessness
would require a finding that a person is stateless for the purpose of
international protection to ensure that they receive the protection of a
nationality.
One rejoinder might be that a 10% threshold seems equally appropriate
when one considers that statelessness is "a fate of ever increasing fear and
distress . .. deplored by the international community of democracies." 2a
With no clear legal guidance on this point, however, it is important to
consider the historic struggle to establish the legal regime on statelessness
and its relationship to the desire of states to retain control over the means of
nationality acquisition. While the measured successes of the protection
regime for stateless persons described in the first section are encouraging,
there is certainly cause for caution in interpreting and applying norms of
protection in this area. Requiring a state to grant its nationality to a child
that demonstrates only a 10% chance of statelessness at birth is likely to
have a chilling effect on the increasing disposition of states to embrace
statelessness protection.
Some practical examples drawn from the Americas may help to
highlight the need to set this standard of protection with states' sovereignty
interests in mind. The Bahamas, a relatively small country that serves as
home to a substantial number of Haitian migrants and their Bahamian-born
children, has also struggled with the question of citizenship rights for this
population. 281 The Bahamas is much less connected to the international
legal frameworks that have driven these questions in the Dominican
Republic, which has ratified the American Convention and the jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court,28 2 and signed the 1961 Convention.m3
279. Audrey Macklin, Who is the Citizen's Other? Considering the Heft of Citizenship, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 354 (2007).
280. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (holding that denationalization of U.S.
citizens who had abandoned their mandatory military service was cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
281. See Kristy A. Belton, Dry Land Drowning or Rip Current Survival? Haitians Without
Status in the Bahamas, 34 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 948, 948-51 (2011).
282. The Bahamas has not ratified the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, nor has it
ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. See OAS, Dep't of Int'l Law, American
Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica" (B-32),
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Nevertheless, human rights advocates have seized upon the statelessness
discourse, and some have pressed statelessness protection as a solution for
Bahamians of Haitian descent that have suffered discriminatory citizenship
practices.2 The campaign to extend international protection to Bahamians
of Haitian descent faces an uphill battle considering the resistance of the
Bahamas to international oversight. In this context, it seems sensible to
advocate for rules and standards that balance individual rights against the
interest of states to regulate nationality.
Another important regional example is that of Chile, where children
born to indigenous migrants have faced challenges in accessing Chilean
nationality. 285 Notably, the Chilean Constitution does not grant jus soli
nationality to children born to foreigners "in transit," 286 which makes the
Inter-American jurisprudence arising from the Dominican context quite
relevant. Chile has not ratified the 1954 or 1961 Conventions, 287 but it has
ratified the American Convention and is under the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court. 288 Moreover, Chile, like many countries in the Americas,
has a mixed record of complying with Inter-American Court decisions,
tending to implement those decisions that are less controversial, but being
slow to implement those that have broader social or political
implications.28 9 Chile offers another example of why caution is appropriate
in setting a standard for the level of risk that that will trigger statelessness
protection.
Of course, one must consider the likely position of states that would
prefer a higher degree of certainty that an individual is stateless before they
are compelled to grant nationality at birth. One could easily imagine a state
standing firmly by the proposition that certainty, or perhaps something just
short of certainty, is the appropriate standard for statelessness
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties-B-32_American_- Conventionon Human Rights-sign.htm
[https://perma.cc/7JNB-3XR7] (listing states that have signed, ratified, and/or acceded to the
American Convention on Human Rights).
283. The Bahamas has failed to ratify both the 1954 Convention, see Status of the 1954
Convention, supra note 81, and the 1961 Convention, see Status of the 1961 Convention, supra
note 85.
284. See, e.g., Grand Bah. Human Rights Assoc., Bahamas 'Risks Causing Statelessness,'
NASSAU GUARDIAN (July 15, 2015), http://www.thenassauguardian.com/news/ 5 7 5 7 0-
bahamas-risks-causing-statelessness [https://perma.cc/2M3T-RP98].
285. See Claudio Fuentes Maureira et al., 3.000 Nifios Esperando su Nacionalidad. La Necesidad
de Contar con Remedios Colectivos para Resolver Vulneraciones Individuales de Derechos [3,000
Children Waiting for Their Nationality. The Need for Collective Remedies to Resolve Violations of
Individual Rights], ANUARIO DE DERECHO PllBLICO (UNIVERSIDAD DIEGO PORTALES) 549, 550
(2016). See also Chile, AMERICAN NETWORK ON NATIONALITY & STATELESSNESS,
http://www.americasns.org/chile/ [https://perma.cc/FD5Y-VUYB].
286. Chile, supra note 285.
287. See Status of the 1954 Convention, supra note 81; UNTC, Status of the 1961
Convention, supra note 85.
288. See OAS, supra note 282.
289. David C. Baluarte & Christian M. De Vos, From Judgment to Justice: Implementing
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determination. In response, it would be important to emphasize that the
right to nationality is a universal human right, and the importance of
deriving a nationality at birth has been emphasized in many of the major
human rights conventions.2m Here, the binary nature of nationality and the
standard that a child should receive protection if she is more likely than not
stateless may resonate. Statistically, a standard more onerous than "more
likely than not" would accept on its face that a person who is more likely
stateless than legally protected by nationality could be ineligible for
international protection, which is an unacceptable outcome under the
international regime of protection for stateless persons. Ultimately, a well-
reasoned "more likely than not" standard may well be viewed as giving
adequate consideration to states' legitimate interests in regulating
nationality acquisition within their own borders, while extending
appropriate protection for the human right to nationality.
These examples highlight the potential for blowback in response to the
doctrinal expansion in the recent decision of the Inter-American Court in
Expelled Haitians and Dominicans. The error of the Inter-American Court was
to extend statelessness protection after it had identified a generalized risk of
statelessness, but before it had decided whether that risk was sufficient to
support a finding that the presumed victims were stateless persons. This
Article urges a more cautious approach than that taken by the Inter-
American Court, but it should not be read to undermine the importance of
the risk assessment suggested by the Court. Rather, this Article provides a
framework for the Court and other international authorities to specifically
assess the risk of statelessness as a means of determining whether a person
is stateless. Ultimately, international law guarantees statelessness
protection only to those who have been deemed stateless persons, but it
should qualify as such those persons who are more likely than not stateless.
CONCLUSION
The international law of statelessness and human rights requires states
to grant nationality to stateless children born in their territory. As the global
effort to combat statelessness has gained momentum in the last decade,
more states have demonstrated a willingness to extend this protection to
stateless children. However, the historic resistance of states to international
regulation of nationality law makes it unlikely that they will adopt a rule
that would require them to grant nationality to a child born in their
territory because of an unquantified risk of statelessness. In applying this
ambiguous rule in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians, the Inter-American
Court has potentially distorted an important human rights norm and risked
undermining the effectiveness of the regional system in its effort to combat
statelessness.
The Court should endeavor to hew its jurisprudence on statelessness
more carefully to the well-established international law rules extending
290. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing the ICCPR and the CRC).
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protection to "stateless persons." At the same time, the Court's decision
points to an area of the law of statelessness where there is significant room
for interpretation, namely in the statelessness determination procedure
itself. The UNHCR has issued guidelines for such determinations, and a
number of states have begun to implement statelessness determination
procedures at the national level. The UNHCR's Handbook on the Protection of
Stateless Persons provides guidance on evidentiary considerations and
suggests that the appropriate standard of proof for demonstrating that a
person is stateless is a "reasonable degree" of certainty, as opposed to
absolute certainty. This standard for demonstrating that a person is
stateless for purposes of international law protection is still open to
interpretation, and this is where the Inter-American Court should focus in
order to advance its concern for those at risk of statelessness. It should do
so by retaining well-understood rules of statelessness protection, and
developing transparent and well-reasoned standards for protection.
A "reasonable degree" of certainty in the context of statelessness
protection means that a person would be more likely than not stateless if
she were left unprotected. This standard is drawn from the fundamental
nature of the right to nationality, and the fact that a person has nationality
or is stateless, and there is no status in between. Because everyone must
have a nationality, the likelihood of statelessness should never be permitted
to exceed the likelihood that one is a national. Accordingly, one should be a
"stateless person" under international law if it is more likely than not that
she will not be considered a national under the operation of the laws of any
country.
Like all such standards, there are many evidentiary questions that must
be resolved and much room for judicial interpretation. Such is the work
that lies ahead for the international community and domestic jurisdictions
around the globe. The Inter-American Court, however, did not engage with
these pressing questions in its decision in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians.
Rather, the Court declared that the state had the burden to demonstrate
that Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent could derive Haitian
nationality, and when the state did not resolve the Court's concerns about
the risk of statelessness, it extended the protection of the international law
of statelessness. Presumably, some large segment of Dominican-born
persons of Haitian descent are covered by this ruling of the Inter-American
Court, but the regional community has no way of knowing who these
individuals are, or what the limits of this protection might be.
The need for clarity in this area is evident in the Dominican Republic
and beyond. Inhabitants of the island of Hispaniola continue to reel from
the latest decision of the Dominican Constitutional Court to reinterpret its
Constitution and remove the basis for nationality of more than 130,000
people. Legislation that restored nationality for some, and opened a
temporary path to naturalization for others, still left tens of thousands of
people without Dominican nationality and at risk of statelessness. 291 If the
291. See SAIS Int'l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 142, at 35; see also Ley No. 169-14 que
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law of statelessness is going to be a real tool in bringing about a resolution
to this problem and others like it around the world, well-established rules
of law must be applied, and international authorities should pursue the
progressive development of standards in applying those rules.
Leadership on this issue will likely fall to the UJNHCR, which is
refining a model law on the protection of stateless persons that includes
statelessness determination guidance.292 The future success of such laws in
the region depends in part on the clarity of commitments that states are
required to take on. While this Article is critical of the Inter-American
Court's most recent contribution to this process, the vulnerability of
stateless persons will continue to be a topic of concern in the region, and the
Inter-American Court is well-positioned to refine its contributions and
advance the protection of the right to nationality.
establece un regimen especial para personas nacidas en el territorio nacional inscritas
irregularmente en el registro civil dominicano y sobre naturalizaci6n [Law 169-14 of 2014,
establishing a special regimen for persons born in the national territory inscribed irregularly in
the Dominican civil registry and on naturalization] (G.O. No. 10756) (May 26, 2014) (Dom.
Rep.).
292. See Observaciones a Ley Modelo del ACNUR para la Proteccidn de las Personas Apdtridas
[Observations on the UNHCR Model Law for the Protection of Stateless Persons], AMERICAS
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